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process of democratization. It thus creates a ‘marketplace of ideas’ which increases the
viability of the resulting institutions. In contrast, a highly-concentrated donor commu-
nity can lead to the imposition of an institutional blueprint, designed in advance and
not adapted to the needs of the recipient society. An instrumental variable analysis with
panel data for 133 countries from 1994 to 2013, explicit tests of the causal mechanism,
and anecdotal evidence from Ghana provide strong support for the benefits of diverse
democracy aid.
Abstract word count: 149
Manuscript word count: 11,011 (including references, excluding tables)
Online appendices:
• A: Data (12 pages)
• B: The instrumental variable approach (24 pages)
• C: Robustness checks (52 pages)
• D: Tracing the causal mechanism in Ghana (10 pages)
*Heidelberg University (Research Center for Distributional Conflict and Globalization), and German Development
Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE); ziaja@uni-heidelberg.de
1
Foreign aid harms democracy – this claim builds on political economy arguments and
has found widespread support in the empirical literature (Ahmed 2012; Bueno de
Mesquita and Smith 2009). However, aid that focuses on government and civil soci-
ety issues, commonly referred to as ‘democracy aid’, has been shown to correlate with
improvements in democracy (Dietrich andWright 2015; Scott and Steele 2011). Democ-
racy aid made up 15 percent of all official aid flows in 2013, or 18 billion USD. Despite
the large sums being spent, the literature is undetermined on why democracy aid seems
to work against the odds. Democracy donors themselves are similarly adrift:
Although increasing numbers of governments and people around the world now endorse
the norm of democracy promotion, even democratic states disagree about how to do it.
[…] Should external actors press first for elections or for the adoption of a constitution?
Should they push for presidential or parliamentary systems, federal or unitary states,
proportional representation in parliament or majoritarian electoral systems? Should
outsiders work with the state or society to press for change? No blueprint is universally
recognized as the most effective way to promote democracy, and in fact, many even reject
the idea that there can be a blueprint (McFaul 2004: 157).
I make a new suggestion on why democracy aid works: it is the very absence of a
blueprint that makes it effective. By virtue of diversity, fragmented aid allows different
interests and actors in the recipient country to find support. As there is no blueprint
for democracy promotion, there is no blueprint for democracy. Supporting different
interests from the outside increases the chances that viable democratic institutions are
established, and that those cleavages are politicized that best represent the interests of
the relevant social groups. The recommendation to provide fragmented aid contradicts
the current development discourse. Most famously, The Paris Declaration on Aid Effective-
ness called for an end to this practice and for better coordinating aid. But a coordinated
approach to democracy promotion, I argue, would have two fundamental flaws. On
the conceptual level, as well-planned as an intervention could be from a technical point
of view, it would create a designed, not a grown democracy. On the political level,
any coordinated approach would ultimately constitute a compromise between donors
rather than an intervention primarily adapted to local requirements.
The most explicit support towards democratizing recipient countries occurs through
democracy aid. Democracy aid is understood as aid explicitly aimed at improving polit-
ical institutions and supporting different types of interest groups (Carothers 2009: 5).
It deals with polity issues. I refer to all other aid collectively as ‘economic aid’ (following
Dietrich andWright 2015), and to the sum of both as ‘general aid’. I study the effects of
democracy aid proliferation – i.e., the presence of a large number of democracy donors –
on democracy in recipient countries. In a sample of 133 countries over the period 1994
to 2013, I find strong support for my hypothesis with both fixed effects and instrumen-
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tal variable specifications. I explicitly examine the causal mechanism with placebo tests
and detailed data on democratic diversity in the recipient country. Anecdotal evidence
from Ghana suggests that the proposed mechanism is plausible on closer inspection.
My findings contribute to various strands of literature. They contribute to the growing
literature that disaggregates the effects of aid on democratization (e.g., Bermeo 2016;
Birchler, Limpach, and Michaelowa 2016). They constitute the first assessment of the
effects of aid fragmentation on democracy, and add to recent findings on benefits of
fragmented aid (e.g., Han and Koenig-Archibugi 2015). And finally, they relate to the
debate on how much competition young democracies tolerate – and require (Bunce
2003; Kapstein and Converse 2008; Wright 2008).
To set the stage for my argument, I first discuss the state of the art on the effects of
foreign aid on democracy. Then I suggest a pathway on how fragmented aid alters these
effects: Democracy donor proliferation provides a ‘market for ideas’ and thus improves
democracy. The literature on early stages of democratization provides a foundation
for this mechanism by showing that the establishment and consolidation of democratic
institutions is an iterative and uncertain process which benefits from diversity at early
stages.
The ambiguous link between aid and democratization
One major argument linking general aid and democracy asserts that the former harms
the latter because it is fungible. Fungibility refers to the ability of recipient governments
to respond to aid inflows by reducing their own contribution in the respective sector,
thus freeing up resources for discretionary use (Feyzioglu, Swaroop, and Zhu 1998).
In most theories of political power, ‘discretionary use’ is equivalent to employing these
additional funds for whatever helps extending the incumbent’s stay in power (Bueno
de Mesquita and Smith 2009). Cruz and Schneider (2017) show that even if autocratic
incumbents cannot make use of aid flows by means of fungibility, they can claim credit
for their beneficial effects. Thus, the inflow of foreign aid makes democratization of
authoritarian states less likely and undermines existing democratic institutions. This
rationale has found widespread support in the empirical literature (e.g., Ahmed 2012;
Kono and Montinola 2009), although Bermeo (2016) recently presented evidence that
these deteriorating effects do not apply anymore after the end of the cold war.
Another channel by which aid may weaken democracy is the disruption of the account-
ability chain between government and citizens (Winters 2010: 223). When a govern-
ment receives aid, it is subject to expectations by the donor, be they explicit or implicit.
Pledges towards the donors compromise the ability of a government to serve its peo-
ple. When a donor’s expectations are articulated and the future disbursement of aid
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depends on the compliance of the recipient, the mechanism is referred to as ‘condi-
tionality’. Conditionality, however, was originally supposed to have the positive con-
notation of nudging recipients towards ‘good governance’. In practice, conditionality
has contributed to spreading the norm of democracy across the globe after the end
of the cold war (Crawford 2001). But the norm has impacted the labeling of regimes,
and not necessarily actual practice, making many nominally democratic regimes today
disfunctional (Brown 2005).
Technical aid explicitly aimed at fostering democracy, or democracy aid, has also many
critics. They argue that democratization is an overwhelmingly domestic process that
can hardly be fostered intentionally from the outside (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986:
18). And if international forces played a role, one might expect large economic factors
such as trade to dwarf aid efforts. When particular attempts to promote democracy
with aid failed despite a strong (including military) engagement, it was often blamed on
trying to impose an institutional blueprint – modeled after the western example – onto
a society with different expectations and structure (Hill 2011).
Despite these pessimistic expectations, empirical studies have linked democracy aid to
positive trends in various aspects of democratic governance (e.g., Finkel, Pérez-Liñán,
and Seligson 2007; Scott and Steele 2011). This may be explained by a reduced fungibil-
ity of democracy aid, and by the effectiveness of certain aspects of technical democracy
aid. Reduced fungibility is mainly due to the fact that a large part of democracy aid does
not go to the government, but to non-state actors (Youngs 2003). Some funds are chan-
neled directly from the donor to non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Bypassing
recipient governments in general aid delivery is often justified with bad governance
reducing efficiency (Dietrich 2013). In the realm of democracy aid, bypassing fulfills
the additional task of building opposition capacity. And official statistics underestimate
the level to which this tool is employed: Many funds are officially recorded as going to
government ministries, but they are actually spent by NGOs (Crawford 2001). Techni-
cal democracy aid may be effective because it immediately addresses how governments
works. For example, external involvement has been shown to make elections more
credible (Hyde 2007). External advisers can also help to implement certain rules or
practices that have been shown to improve democratic stability, such as proportional
electoral systems, term limits, or improvements to the rule of law (Magen and Morlino
2009). These measures can help break the ‘trap of pessimistic expectations’ that would
otherwise make people decide that all politicians are corrupt (Svolik 2013: 687). The
accountability chain is thus actually strengthened, not weakened, by democracy aid:
‘assistance to new democracies that empowers the civil society and independent media
may help voters to evaluate candidates’ performance with lesser effort and greater pre-
cision’ (Svolik 2013: 698). Gottlieb (2016), for example, shows with a field experiment
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in Mali that educating the population about democracy increases the accountability of
governments. It is unclear, however, if all or any particular traits of democracy aid are
sufficient to overcome the abundance of obstacles in promoting democracy. I make
the novel claim that one of the driving forces behind the effectiveness of democracy
aid is fragmentation. But before expounding the core of my argument, I present some
properties of democracy processes relevant to my explanation.
The uncertainty of democratization processes
Most countries in the world today claim to be democracies. But many democracies are
deficient, or simply a facade to an autocratic regime. And whenever societies attempt to
become more democratic, they face a plethora of challenges (Casper and Taylor 1996;
O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986). Democratization is an inherently uncertain process.
At any stage – be it the liberalization of autocratic rule, the establishment of democratic
institutions or their consolidation – the danger of an autocratic backlash looms. Un-
til democratization succeeds, nobody can reliably predict the institutional setup that
turns out to be stable. The uncertainty is due to the iterative process of power strug-
gles among the participating actors. Since the end of the cold war, many transitions
occurred as ‘negotiated revolutions’, and not as quick, clean and bloody breaks (Law-
son 2005). During the negotiations, many options are tested, many fail, and only the
subset that works is finally selected. It is a process of ‘trial and error’, a method that has
proven successful in many socio-economic fields (Harford 2011). Out of many details
on the way towards establishing a democracy, few work in a particular instance, and
finding these can require several attempts.1
What increases uncertainty is a lack of control by political leaders. Bunce (2003) ar-
gues that the ability of leaders to steer transitions has often been exaggerated. Leaders
are frequently doomed to reacting to developments rather than being able to shape
them (Bellin 2000: 204). In past attempts to support democratization from the out-
side, excessive trust in the ability of leaders to manage democratization led donors to
1One could ask why trial-and-error approaches – and thus diversity – do not improve the effects of
economic aid as well. The reason is, I argue, that economic aid in developing countries focuses mostly
on basic, universal and tested interventions, such as maternal health, immunization, primary education,
roads and water. Economic policies can also be highly complex and unpredictable, such as designing the
global financial architecture. But most issues in developing countries tend to have rather simple solutions
that tend to fail due to implementation and the political economy, not due to design. Democracy, how-
ever, is a high-tech product that requires innovation. And trial and error is necessary where one needs
to solve complex tasks with outcomes that are nearly impossible to simulate in advance. Furthermore,
advances in governance are set to generate better policies and stability in the future, whereas advances
in economic policies – even if created through trial-and-error processes – may quickly be lost when faced
with political instability. Thus, democracy aid benefits more from market-like approaches than other aid
sectors, where coherence is comparatively more important than innovation.
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bond with the in-group of a newly formed government, out of concern to compromise
stability with a more open process (e.g., Rakner 2012: 17). This concern was derived
from the notion that transitions should be negotiated in small circles of incumbent and
opposition elites (Rustow 1970). Pacting among elites and demobilizing the public were
considered useful because they help to reduce the number items on the bargaining table
and the threat of polarization (Linz 1978). Recent empirical research finds that muted
competition does not lead to better outcomes: Demonstrations, a wider spectrum of po-
litical parties, and other forms of participation make young democracies more resilient
(Brownlee 2009; Bunce 2003; Kapstein and Converse 2008; Wright 2008). Diversity
is particularly crucial in poor, young democracies. During the first couple of elections,
party systems consolidate, defining those social cleavages that are politicized (Zielin-
ski 2002). Only interests that are supported financially have good chances of finding
a place in the system. In the words of Dahl (1971: 49), scattered resources result in
dispersing the ‘nonviolent means of coercion, persuasion and inducement’. Where a
diverse set of domestic philanthropic sponsors is missing, external sources such as dias-
poras may take on the crucial role of funding pluralistic oppositions (Arriola 2013: 249).
Not only does more diverse funding create more valid institutions. It also decreases the
desire of out-groups to challenge the order that is being created, making them feel less
excluded (Wright 2008). For example, Conroy-Krutz and Moehler (2015) show with a
field experiment that young democracies can benefit from pluralism: Partisan media
in Ghana did not lead to increased polarization, but it moderated political competition,
in line with advocates of deliberation such as John Stuart Mill and Jürgen Habermas.
But these arguments do not apply exclusively to young democracies. In older regimes,
external funding and inspiration can help overlooked groups to win the ‘war of attri-
tion’ necessary to invade a frozen party system (Zielinski 2002: 202). Increasing diver-
sity in authoritarian regimes can also be beneficial. Competitive authoritarian regimes
are more likely to be followed by democracy than other authoritarian regimes (Brown-
lee 2009). On the contrary, pressure to transition to multiparty systems can hinder
sustainable democratization when opposition parties are too weak to compete with the
old elites (Brown 2005: 190). Democracies ‘born with deeply oligarchic and exclusivist
traits’ are more vulnerable to failure (Slater 2013: 761–2). Diversified financial and
ideational sources could help identify and strengthen those actors and policies that can
compete, bringing the system a step closer to implementing true multiparty democracy.
Donor proliferation creates a marketplace for ideas
In the absence of diversified domestic wealth, fragmented aid can be the crucial ingredi-
ent to making emerging democracies sustainable. To development scholars and practi-
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tioners alike, this claim may come as a surprise. Most would endorse the statement that
more fragmented aid is less effective, and potentially harmful (Acharya, Fuzzo de Lima,
andMoore 2006: 14). In particular, fragmentation has been shown to impact negatively
on governance in the recipient country. The presence of a large number of donors puts
high transaction costs on the recipient government, forcing officials to cater divergent
donor interests at the same time (Morss 1984). The resulting conundrum gives corrupt
officials the possibility of directing their individual attention selectively towards projects.
This increases their leverage for gathering personal rewards and reduces bureaucratic
quality. Bureaucratic ineffectiveness then leads to reduced economic growth (Djankov,
Montalvo, and Reynal-Querol 2009). Donors also compete with the government for
the best-qualified personnel. By hiring away the most capable managers, they reduce
the administrative capacity in the recipient country (Knack and Rahman 2007).
The positive effects of fragmented aid on democratization stem from amechanisms that
alters the aid-and-democratization link: Fragmented aid usually comes with a presence
of many donors that provide different ideas on democracy. The introductory quote by
McFaul mentions how difficult it is for donors to do the ‘right thing’ in democracy pro-
motion. Not knowing what is best, offering an array of options is more likely to provide
useful input for the recipient society. Only recently have authors begun to point out
advantages of aid fragmentation. Where more donors provide aid, aid shocks are less
likely, which reduces the probability of conflict onset (Nielsen et al. 2011). My argu-
ment does not primarily build on the continuity of financial flows, but on the diversity
of ideas on how democracy should work. Such ideas are part of many aid projects, as
donors aim at including ‘participatory development’ components in all suitable aid sec-
tors. But democracy aid is the natural suspect to transmit the bulk of ideas: reforming
the polity is its main objective.
All donors offer a slightly different aid program with different political orientations, as
has been shown particularly with regard to the European Union and the United States
(Magen, Risse, and McFaul 2009). Some donors focus on the institutions of the state,
some on non-governmental organizations and some on free press. These differences
can be explained by donor political economies that favor, e.g., market-based or state-
based approaches (Dietrich 2016). Online appendix B provides a detailed overview
of donor portfolios in the area of ‘strengthening civil society’, a core component of
democracy aid. It shows that donors actually emphasize support to different sectors.
For example, several Nordic donors focus on human rights, Japan focuses on commu-
nity participation, and Spain focuses on women organizations. Where more donors
are present, they are more likely to support diverse stakeholders – both within and be-
yond government – that are able to hold the executive to account (cp. Rakner 2012).
Figure 1 shows that there are no crowding-out effects either: donors providing aid to
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recipient countries where many democracy donors are active do not have less projects
in these countries, but more. Only in such a diverse environment can the multitude
of non-governmental actors involved in a democratization process find the best-fitting
support. Even with the best of intentions, a single donor could not cater as many po-
litical hues as a group of donors can. And while all donors share a basic set of western
values, they differ sufficiently in how they intend to preserve these values, making each
donor a potentially crucial contribution. Crawford (2001: 35) notes:
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Figure 1: Number of democracy aid projects per donor in a recipient country by the
number of democracy donors
The objection to the promotion of a western model […] does overlook the variety of institu-
tional forms that exist within western nations themselves. Nevertheless, it remains valid
to question the extent to which donors will encourage local participation in determining
the most appropriate form.
I argue that donor proliferation can encourage local participation much better than
donor concentration could. The domestic ‘marketplace of ideas’ (Snyder andBallentine
1996) is balanced by external intervention. One may certainly doubt that aid functions
as a perfect market, efficiently aligning supply and demand. Easterly (2002) argues
that foreign aid rather resembles a cartel. While this may be true on the global level,
one does find variation on the project level: Competition betweenmanagers whose pro-
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fessional careers depend on making their project visible creates market-like structures
(Harford, Hadjimichael, and Klein 2004). But how do these small-scale effects aggre-
gate to impact the overall quality of democracy in the recipient country? Decentralized
approaches at problem-solving have been shown to be very effective in institution build-
ing (Ostrom 1990). As practicing participation fosters democratic attitudes (Quintelier
and Van Deth 2014), foreign-funded diversity is likely to facilitate the establishment of
democratic institutions on the national level, even if donors do not directly administer
their establishment.
An additional benefit of a diverse aid landscape is a decreased danger of being left com-
pletely without aid when one donor pulls out unexpectedly, an event which has been
quite frequent in the past (van deWalle 2012; Youngs 2003). If a particular donor pulls
out, the remaining donors may not fully compensate this loss by supporting the very
same actors; but at least some agents of change will continue to receive assistance. A sim-
ilar logic applies to sudden changes in the political orientation of donors, which affect
democracy assistance as well (Weissenbach 2015: 347). Only diversity can guarantee
the adequate coverage of different ideological positions.
I contend that, beyond these positive effects of donor proliferation, the negative effects
purported for economic aid are severely mitigated for democracy aid. The number
of local partners – such as NGOs and political parties – exceeds the number of donors
even in themost fragmented settings, inverting the unfavorable relationship of one host
versus dozens of donors, as encountered in economic aid.2 Supporting non-state actors
is, of course, not a silver bullet. A country’s NGO scene may be biased, for example by
representing mostly urban interests, such as in Mali (van deWalle 2012: 11). Critics say
that fundingNGOs from the outside leads to clientelistic relationships, causingNGOs to
search short-term benefits instead of pursuing their original goals (Henderson 2002).
But advocates of democracy promotion insist that supporting NGO activity leads to
positive political change (Diamond 1995). This positive effect may even be achieved by
simply providing the necessary infrastructure, independent of the goals pursued by the
agencies (Brown, Brown, and Desposato 2008). Jamal (2012) suggests that the positive
effect only materializes when preceding political settlements were sufficiently inclusive.
An exclusive NGO setting with little diversity exacerbates problems. This is where the
supply of diversity from the outside can make a palpable contribution. The ‘diversity
hypothesis’ that I test below thus reads:
The presence of a large number of democracy donors has a positive effect on democracy in the recipient
country.
2In economic aid, the national government is of course not the only partner, but usually one main
partner, or at least an involved gatekeeper.
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Research design
To assess my hypotheses on fragmented aid and democracy, I apply fixed-effects and
instrumental variable regression models to panel data for 133 countries over the period
1994 to 2013. If meaningful effects of fragmented aid exist, they should be observable
on the macro level and in aggregate democracy indices (cp. Knack and Rahman 2007:
193). But I will also examine effects on sub-components of democracy that are closer
to the suggested causal mechanism. The cross-country evidence is supplemented by
anecdotal evidence from Ghana with the aim of verifying the plausibility of the causal
mechanism.
The explained variable is democracy as measured by the V-Dem project in their pol-
yarchy score (Coppedge, Gerring, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, et
al. 2017). The main explanatory variable is democracy donor proliferation, i.e., the number
of donors reporting democracy aid in a given year to a given recipient. It is calculated
from project-level data on aid commitments provided by the AidData Research Release
3.0 (Tierney et al. 2011). ‘Commitments’ are pledges made by the donors, whereas ac-
tual flows are known as ‘disbursements’. AidData commitment data, however, is much
more comprehensive than disbursement data provided by the Organization for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD), in particular with regard to the sector
coding. In line with previous research (e.g., Dietrich and Wright 2015), I consider the
aid sector government and civil society to reflect democracy aid flows.3 All aid variables
employed in this study exclude debt relief, emergency aid and amounts spent in the
donor country, as these contributions are less likely to transmit ideas or affect condi-
tionality negotiations. The universe of cases analyzed is all countries with more than
half a million inhabitants defined by the OECD to be eligible for receiving Official Devel-
opment Aid (ODA). Democracy aid has been reported since 1973, but a substantial part
of the strong time trend in the data is likely to be due to underreporting in early years.
Records become more reliable in the mid-1990’s. My sample ranges from 1994 to 2013
and makes use of the 20 most recent years of available data. The sample is placed well
inside the post-cold-war period, creating a fairly constant geopolitical background for
the analysis.
Most democracy assistance studies employ yearly data. This is problematic, as fluctua-
tions are often due to technical or bureaucratic considerations, and not due to changes
in actual implementation practice. While these issues exist for disbursement data, the
temporal discrepancy between reporting and implementation grows even further for
commitment data. Clemens et al. (2012: 594) discuss the appropriate length of tem-
3Online appendix C gives results for narrower measures of democracy aid (and a range of other
robustness checks) and confirms my findings.
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poral units of observation for the related field of aid-and-growth studies. Short time
windows may not leave enough time for effects to materialize in common econometric
settings with one-period lags, but they allow for using unit-fixed effects. Long time win-
dows may blur short- and mid-term effects, but they also reduce endogeneity concerns
even further and show whether effects persist (cp. Kersting and Kilby 2014: 133). I
choose three-year averages as a compromise between analytic power and data reliability
for my main specifications. A majority of three-year periods will also comprise national
or sub-national elections, thus providing intervals between which one can plausibly ex-
pect to observe changes in democratic quality.
The ‘naive’ specifications I employ are ordinary least squares (OLS) models with period
and country fixed effects and lagged explanatory variables. Clemens et al. (2012) argue
that this approach takes care of most endogeneity issues, and many authors follow their
recommendation (e.g., Jones and Tarp 2016). Country fixed effects remove alternative
explanations that do not vary substantially over time. Year fixed effects capture global
democratization trends. Causality could of course still run in the opposite direction:
Donors might prefer countries that are improving their democracy scores. But as I lag
my explanatory variables by one three-year period and use both country and year fixed
effects, donors would have to be good in predicting trends in democratization for this
effect to contaminate my estimates. I consider this unlikely, given the bad track-record
of predicting events such as the Arab spring (cp. Bermeo 2016 online appendix: 2–3).
A common cause for both increased donor interest in a recipient country and improve-
ment in the latter’s democracy would be another source of bias. Political stability might
be conducive to both, at certain stages of liberalization, so I control for civil conflict
(Gleditsch et al. 2002). In order to avoid a garbage can model, I restrict my model
to two additional variables on the right-hand side: population and income per capita
(Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer 2015). The country-fixed effects account for a large
range of competing explanations of democracy with little temporal variation, such as
ethnic diversity.
But given a plethora of alternative common causes, an excludable instrumental vari-
able (IV) can bring more certainty with regard to the direction of causality. In my IV
approach, I estimate the level of democracy Y in recipient country i at time t with the
following equation:
Yit = β1Dˆi,t−1 + β2Xi,t−1 + αi + τt + ϑit,
where Dˆ is the estimated number of donors, X a vector of control variables, α country
fixed effects, τ period fixed effects and ϑ the error term. This equation constitutes the
second stage of a two-stage least-squares (2SLS) model. D is estimated in a first stage
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using the instrument Z and the same set of control variables and country and period
fixed effects, as well as an error term κ:
Di,t−1 = δ1Zi,t−1 + δ2Xi,t−1 + αi + τt + κijt.
Z is calculated on the dyadic level, with donor-recipient years as unit of observation,
and aggregated by summing over all donors for each recipient year:
Zit =
N∑
j=1
(Qjt ∗ Kij),
where Q is the donor-level instrument varying by donor j and time t. K is the recipient-
level instrument, varying by donor j and recipient i. With this ‘interaction approach’,
I follow recent suggestions to interact exogenous variables on the donor side with en-
dogenous recipient properties in order to increase cross-sectional variance (Ahmed and
Werker 2015; Dietrich andWright 2015; Dreher and Langlotz 2015; Galiani et al. 2017;
Nunn and Qian 2014).4
As instrument Q for fragmented democracy aid, I employ the share of female legislators
(or ‘women in parliament’) in the donor country, as suggested by Dietrich and Wright
(2015: 223). They argue, building on Breuning (2001), that women are more likely to
support social-equity issues, and they show empirically that the share of female legisla-
tors is a good predictor of democracy aid (Dietrich and Wright 2015: online appendix
C). I use the instrument to predict whether a specific donor provides democracy aid
at all. This introduces the additional assumption that female legislators are not only
able to realize higher democracy aid budgets, but to initiate (or revive) democracy aid
programmes. I consider this assumption defensible as it follows the same logic as the
original rationale. In online appendix B, I show that the share of female legislators is
indeed even better suited to predict this binary property than to predict democracy aid
amounts.5 The instrument is plausibly excludable: There is no reason to believe that
the gender composition of a donor country’s parliament should affect democracy in a
recipient country directly. Dietrich and Wright (2015: 224) also show that alternative
paths from women in parliament to democracy are unlikely, given low bivariate corre-
lations with trade, immigration, membership in international organizations, alliances
and NGO presence.
Since I want to compare the effects of democracy donor proliferation to donor prolif-
4Instead of simply aggregating the dyadic instrument onto the monadic level, Dreher and Langlotz
(2015) employ a ‘zero-stage’ to explicitly model the expected amount of aid. I adapt their approach to
predict the number of donors in online appendix B. The results of this zero-stage approach differ only
marginally from the interaction approach.
5The appendix also provides plots that show the temporal variation in the instrument.
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eration in other aid sectors, I also need instruments for general and economic aid. For
these sectors, I employ legislative fractionalization – defined as ‘the probability that two
deputies picked at random from the legislature will be of different parties’ (Beck et al.
2001: 174) – as instrument Q on the donor side. Ahmed (2016: 191–193) suggests
this instrument and shows that the U.S. House of Representatives passes larger foreign
aid budgets when it is fractionalized. Expanding the application of the instrument to
28 donor countries, Dreher and Langlotz (2015) show that legislative fractionalization
leads to higher government expenditures, and thus presumably to higher aid budgets.
On the recipient side, K is the share of years in which a recipient receives aid in the
respective sector. Nunn and Qian (2014) suggest this ‘propensity’ instrument, which
is also used by Dreher and Langlotz (2015) and Ahmed (2016). It is very powerful
in predicting whether a donor provides aid to a particular recipient and introduces
variation at the recipient level that allows for using country fixed effects. I also test my
hypotheses with an alternative recipient-level instrument suggested by Dietrich and
Wright (2015: 224), who employ the inverted share of the distance between donor and
recipient for K. I modify the approach by only inverting the distance, but dispensing
from standardizing it to relative distances, as I expect the probability of a particular
donor to cater a recipient country to be a function of absolute distance. This conforms
to the specifications employed in most aid allocation studies.
Note that Kij is time-invariant, whereas Qjt is recipient-invariant. Combined with coun-
try and period fixed effects, there is no need to include the constitutive terms of the in-
teraction in the first stage. More importantly, the fixed effects deal with the exogenous
component of the interaction: Neither the propensity to receive aid not the distance to
a donor country is independent from the level of democracy in the recipient country.
But combining the interaction term with fixed effects reduces the demands on the iden-
tifying assumption: I must only assume that the level of democracy in countries with
different propensities to receive democracy aid will be equally affected by changes in
the share of women in the donor parliament if they have the same number of democ-
racy donors, conditional on the other control variables (Ahmed 2016: 196; cp. Dreher
and Langlotz 2015: 8–9).6 The endogenous components cannot exert an independent
effect on democracy.
To measure the share of female legislators, I use data from Paxton, Hughes, and Green
(2006), provided and updated by the V-Dem project (Coppedge, Gerring, Lindberg,
Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, et al. 2017). Data on legislative fractionalization
comes from the Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al. 2001). Distance data is
calculated from the cshapes package (Weidmann, Kuse, and Gleditsch 2010). Online
6See Nizalova and Murtazashvili (2016) for a formal proof for the case of combining exogenous treat-
ments with endogenous factors.
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appendix A provides summary statistics and more detailed information on all data em-
ployed. Online appendix B provides more detailed information on the instrumental
variable approach.
Empirical analysis
Panel A in Table 1 provides OLS estimates of the correlations of the number of democ-
racy donors with democracy levels. All specifications include country and year fixed
effects, but they differ with regard to the aid sector of interest and the control variables
that are included.7 Standard errors are clustered by country and shown in terms of
95-percent confidence intervals. Model 1 demonstrates that democracy donor prolifer-
ation has a positive and significant correlation with democracy scores in the following
three-year period. This relationship holds when aid amounts and other controls are
introduced (model 2; model 3 is equivalent, it only differs in the IV specification). The
coefficients for aid amounts are also reported in the table. They do not reach signifi-
cance, albeit in a model that does not include the number of democracy donors, they
do (see online appendix C). One could interpret this as tentative support for the claim
that it is the number of democracy donors that makes democracy aid effective, not the
amount of financial commitments. In substantive terms, an additional donor is associ-
ated with an increase in democracy of about 1 on the 0 to 100 scale, whereas democracy
aid amounts must be doubled to achieve an effect similar in size (and of larger uncer-
tainty). Democracy donor proliferation also maintains a positive and significant corre-
lation with democracy when economic donor proliferation and economic aid amount
are added to the model (model 4; the sector results are displayed side-by-side in two
columns to economize on space). The latter’s coefficient is not significant, which goes
in line with the proposition that ideas on democracy are predominantly conveyed via
democracy aid, and not via economic aid.8 Model 5 shows that general donor prolif-
eration is not significantly related to democracy levels either when employing control
variables.
Panel C provides the estimates for the first stages of the 2SLSmodels.9 Model 1, without
control variables, shows a significant positive correlation of the interacted instrument
with the actual number of democracy donors. A Kleibergen-Paap (KP) F-statistic of 32
suggests that there is little reason to worry about a weak instrument. Not using control
7Online appendix C provides full regression tables for all models.
8One might be concerned about introducing multicollinearity when employing donor proliferation
and aid amounts simultaneously, even more so when two sectors are included at the same time. The
correlations between these three variables range between 0.51 and 0.67. But the maximum VIF for a
pooled version of model 4 is 4.9, thus multicollinearity should not be of concern.
9Table B2 in the online appendix also provides the reduced form estimates corresponding to the IV
specifications. They behave as expected.
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Table 1: Donor proliferation and democracy
Dependent variable (panels A and B): democracy
(1) (2) (3) (4a) (4b) (5)
Aid sector: democracy democracy democracy democracy & economic general
Panel A: OLS estimates
Sector donor prolif. 1.03∗ 0.96∗ 0.96∗ 0.84∗ 0.02 0.49
[0.52; 1.54] [0.47; 1.46] [0.47; 1.46] [0.32; 1.37] [−0.51; 0.55] [−0.08; 1.06]
Sector aid (log) 1.09 1.09 0.79 3.51∗ 5.21∗
[−0.15; 2.32] [−0.15; 2.32] [−0.37; 1.95] [0.79; 6.24] [1.89; 8.53]
R2 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93
Panel B: 2SLS estimates
Sector donor prolif. (est.) 2.58∗ 2.72∗ 3.39∗ 1.98∗ 1.50 1.50
[1.26; 3.91] [1.42; 4.02] [1.24; 5.55] [0.31; 3.66] [−0.43; 3.42] [−0.51; 3.59]
Sector aid (log) −0.60 −1.24 −0.40 −1.97 2.36
[−2.13; 0.93] [−3.53; 1.04] [−2.01; 1.22] [−5.98; 2.03] [−3.44; 8.16]
R2 0.91 0.91 0.89 0.91 0.92
Dependent variable (panel C): sector donor proliferation
Panel C: First-stage estimates (for panel B)
IV democr. donor prolif. 0.36∗ 0.36∗ 0.21∗† 0.32∗ 0.12∗
[0.24; 0.49] [0.24; 0.47] [0.12; 0.31] [0.21; 0.44] [0.04; 0.20]
IV econ. donor prolif. −0.97 4.07∗
[−2.84; 0.90] [2.57; 5.57]
IV general donor prolif. 3.68∗
[2.24; 5.11]
Democracy aid (log) 0.99∗ 0.80∗ 0.87∗ 0.17
[0.33; 1.64] [0.18; 1.43] [0.31; 1.44] [−0.09; 0.42]
Economic aid (log) 1.27∗ 1.52∗
[0.02; 2.52] [0.72; 2.33]
General aid (log) 2.00∗
[0.94; 3.07]
KP F-statistic 32.39 34.68 18.02 15.08 21.64 25.16
Donor IV WiP WiP WiP WiP leg. fract. leg. fract.
Recipient IV propensity propensity distance propensity propensity propensity
Model properties (all panels):
Covariates no yes yes yes yes
Observations 715 715 715 715 715
Recipients 133 133 133 133 133
∗) 95-percent confidence interval does not include zero [confidence intervals in brackets; clustered by recipient country].
†) coefficient and confidence interval scaled by factor 100 for presentation purposes.
Observation unit is a country three-year period. All explanatory variables are lagged by one period. All models include
country and year fixed effects. Covariates include population (log), GDP per capita (log), and civil conflict (dummy).
Abbreviations and definitions: IV: instrumental variable; (est.) donor prolif.: (estimated) donor proliferation, i.e.,
number of donors providing more than 100,000 USD in a given year; KP: Kleibergen-Paap; WiP: share of women in
donor parliament; leg. fract.: legislative fractionalization; propensity: propensity to receive aid in the respective sector
within the overall time period; distance: distance between donor and recipient capitals in 1,000 kilometers, inverted.
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variables would be justified with a ‘good’ instrument, as it would effectively randomize
the treatment. However, in many applied situations, the quasi-randomization is con-
ditional on other covariates (Angrist and Pischke 2009: 175).10 In the present case,
larger countries may be more likely to attract larger numbers of donors, as may poor
countries, and countries at peace. I include these controls in model 2, as in the corre-
sponding OLSmodel. Aid amounts play a somewhat ambiguous role, as they constitute
a different type of information from the same channel. But the indicator donor prolifer-
ation does not simply contain less information than the indicator aid amounts. Figure 2
demonstrates that countries with many donors always get a lot of aid. But even with
few donors, aid amounts may be high.
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Figure 2: Distribution of democracy aid amounts by democracy donor proliferation
over recipients by year
It shows in the aid coefficient of model 2 (panel C) that the amount helps predict the
number of donors. Despite including this control, the instrument retains a significant
coefficient of the same size (0.36) and a KP F-statistic well above the recommended
threshold of 10 (Staiger and Stock 1997). In model 3, which employs the instrumental
variable approach of Dietrich andWright (2015), the role of aid amounts becomes some-
10Covariates may also help reduce the variability in the dependent variable and thus enable more
precise estimation.
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what more complicated.11 Dietrich and Wright employ the interaction of the share of
female legislators in the donor country with the distance between donor country and
recipient country capital as an instrument for the amount of aid per capita. I employ the
same approach to the number of donors. Online appendix B shows, however, that the
instrument is strong for the number of donors, and much less so for aid amounts, in
either absolute or per capita terms. I interpret this as support for the proposition that
the instrument is well-suited to predict democracy donor proliferation in my sample.
Model 4 instruments for both the number of democracy donors and the number of eco-
nomic donors. Attempting to identify the causal effects of two endogenous regressors
simultaneously is generally ill-advised. Nonetheless, my strategy provides me with in-
struments for both regressors that differ sufficiently in design, and if my findings hold
in such a setting, I am inclined to be more confident that my hypothesis touches upon
a causal mechanism. The coefficients for the instruments are positive and significant
for the corresponding sectors, as expected. The KP F-statistics are above 10 for both
instruments and thus indicate sufficient instrument strength. Model 5 replicates model
2 with general donor proliferation instead of democracy donor proliferation. The in-
teracted instrument consisting of legislative fractionalization in the donor country and
the propensity to receive aid seems to work fine, as coefficient sign, significance and KP
F-statistic indicate.
Panel B presents the results of the second stage estimates of the 2SLS models. They
fully confirm the OLS estimates, with the coefficients for democracy donor prolifera-
tion having positive signs and confidence intervals that exclude zero (models 1 to 4).
Coefficient sizes for democracy donor proliferation are larger than the OLS estimates,
by factors around three. Coefficients for economic donor proliferation – estimated in
joint model 4 – and general donor proliferation (model 5) are larger than in the OLS
specifications, but not significant.
Figure 3 gives an impression of the substantive effects estimated by IVmodel 2 (panel B).
It provides estimates of the expected level of democracy, given the number of democ-
racy donors. The other covariates are set to the average values that Ghana reached
in the period 2012 to 2013, comprising a population of 26 million, a GDP per capita
of 735 USD, no civil conflict and democracy aid commitments of 203 million USD per
year. Reducing the number of democracy donors from the realized 22 to the sample
median of 11 results in a decrease of expected democracy by 32 points (from 90 to 58)
– a massive decrease on a scale ranging from 0 to 100. The size of the effect becomes
more credible when one recalls that instrumental variables recover the local average
treatment effect (LATE), which I discuss in detail in the next section. In a nutshell,
11As noted in the previous section, I employ a different transformation of the distance variable than
Dietrich and Wright.
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Figure 3: Expected levels of democracy conditional on the number of democracy
donors
the OLS estimates average over all cases, whereas the IV estimates focus on the cases
that are likely to be offered democracy aid and likely to accept it. The corresponding
decrease predicted by OLS model 2 (panel A) would amount to only .96 x 11 = 11.
Discussing the IV assumptions
As a large share of my causal claims rests on the instrumental variables approach, a dis-
cussion of whether its assumptions are met is in order (cp. Sovey and Green 2011: 198).
Exclusion restriction, independence assumption and instrument strength have been
discussed above. But do the homogeneity of treatment effects assumption, the mono-
tonicity assumption and the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA) hold?
The homogeneity of treatment assumption states that the effect of the treatment on
the outcome is independent from how the treatment was incentivized. Do democracy
donors that cater a recipient country due to the influence of female legislators in the
donor countries have a different effect than democracy donors present for other rea-
sons? Female-legislator induced donor presence should, following the argument of
Dietrich and Wright (2015), imply an honest intention to promote democracy. Democ-
racy donors present for other reasons – such as geo-political interests – may not be
that committed. Bouchet (2016) describes how the United States hardly pushed their
Middle Eastern and North African allies towards democracy at all. While there were
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some signs to correct this course during the Arab spring, recent disappointments have
led the United States to fall back into their initial laissez-faire position. The effects esti-
mated here are thus probably not generalizable to all democracy donors. This violation
of the assumption of homogeneous treatment effects may explain the large difference
between OLS and IV estimates. The LATE is restricted to honest attempts of democ-
racy promotion. But there is no reason to expect that the female-legislators induced
LATE differs substantially from the LATE of other honest attempts to promote democ-
racy. The bottom line is almost trivial: a large number of honest democracy donors can
promote democracy effectively.
The monotonicity assumption states that if any case behaves contrary to what the in-
centive provided by the instrument implies, one cannot estimate the causal effect of the
variable of interest. This assumption is best discussed in potential outcomes terminol-
ogy.12 Cases that behave contrary to incentives are called ‘defiers’. In this application,
defiers would be recipient countries that have few democracy donors despite being fre-
quent recipients of democracy aid from donors with large shares of female legislators.
Recipient countries would also be defiers if they had many democracy donors despite
being infrequent recipients of democracy aid or being catered by donors with few fe-
male legislators. The dyadic nature of my instrumental variable complicates justifying
this argument. I disaggregate the potential outcomes further in online appendix B.
My conclusion is that defiers are unlikely to exist. Female legislators should not stop
donors from providing nor recipients from accepting democracy aid. Also, cutting
ties in frequent democracy aid relationships (i.e., dyads with high propensity to record
democracy aid) should be rather rare. The monotonicity assumption is thus met.
Finally, I must consider the SUTVA, which implies that a recipient’s democracy is not af-
fected by the treatment that another recipient receives, or by the outcome that another
recipient experiences. One could very well imagine that increased participation in-
duced by democracy donors spreads from one country to the other. Moreover, democ-
racy is clearly spatially correlated (Gleditsch and Ward 2006). The Arab spring is a
prime example for such a chain reaction (although it is unclear what role democracy
aid played here). Considering the possibility of contamination across units, I test in
online appendix C whether my results hold when using standard errors that allow for
spatial clustering among neighbors. All results hold.
12See Morgan and Winship (2015: 305–324) for an introduction.
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Robustness checks
While the models presented in table 1 constitute my best shot at modeling the relation-
ship between democracy donor proliferation and democracy, a range of alternative,
reasonable modeling decisions exists. Online appendix C verifies whether different
choices would change the substantive results of my study. The general conclusion is
that they would not.
The results are robust to using a range of alternative indicators: aid disbursements
instead of aid commitments (for both the number of donors and aid amounts); aid
controls in per capita terms and as a share of GDP instead of in absolute terms; al-
ternative democracy indicators as dependent variables, including Polity IV, Freedom
House, theUnifiedDemocracy Scale. Using alternative indicators for aid fragmentation
as suggested by Gehring et al. (2017) yields mixed results: the number of small democ-
racy donors produces the same statistically significant relationship with democracy as
the number of all democracy donors does. Specifications with an inverted Herfindahl-
Hirschman-Index that measures the fragmentation of financial flows produce no re-
sults. This index, however, does not capture the concept of diversity as the number of
donors does; higher amounts of aid do not necessarily transmit more ideas. A concen-
tration ratio that captures the share of democracy aid that the three largest donors pro-
vide is not significant at the 95-percent level, but it comes close, with consistently correct
signs. When looking at sub-indices of democracy to disaggregate the explained variable,
I reject the null hypothesis of no effect for V-Dem’s liberal and participatory principles,
but not for the deliberative and the egalitarian principles. This finding makes sense
since I expect diversity to foster primarily formal democratic practice and participa-
tion.
The results are also mostly robust to using alternative samples: samples based on one-
year, two-year and four-year time periods as temporal unit, instead of three years; and
geographic sub-samples (sub-Saharan African countries versus countries from all other
regions). Temporal sub-samples of ten years each do not produce statistically significant
results, but this may be due to a reduced number of observations. A 15-year period
from 1999 to 2013 produces results similar to the main specifications. Also, regime sub-
samples with countries above, below or around the global median in democracy do not
produce consistently significant results. Again, this may be due to smaller sample sizes,
since at least the IV models’ confidence intervals only barely include zero.
The results are also largely robust to alternative modeling choices: lagged dependent
variablemodels; models including a squared term for the number of democracy donors;
models including global or regional linear time trends; models with contemporane-
ous instead of lagged explanatory variables; models with standard errors clustered by
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Table 2: IV estimates with alternative and placebo sectors
Democracy Democracy, no PB Civil society Economic Health Energy
No. of donors (est.) 2.72∗ 4.25∗ 2.63∗ −3.08 −1.06 −0.41
[1.42; 4.02] [0.97; 7.53] [0.87; 4.39] [−14.75; 8.59] [−5.42; 3.30] [−4.54; 3.72]
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Period fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Additional controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
# of observations 715 715 715 715 715 715
# of countries 133 133 133 133 133 133
R2 0.91 0.86 0.91 0.87 0.91 0.92
KP F-statistic 34.68 6.55 16.16 0.95 6.36 7.43
*) 95% confidence interval clustered at the country level (in brackets) does not include zero;
dependent variable: V-Dem polyarchy democracy index scaled to a range of [0; 100];
all explanatory variables lagged by one period.
both country and time period; andmodels with heteroscedasticity-and-auto-correlation-
robust standard errors. Models including interactions of the number of democracy
donors with the level of aid indicate that aid amounts actually condition the effect of
donor proliferation somewhat: only above 6 USD per capita or above 10 million USD
in absolute democracy aid commitments, the coefficient estimates for the number of
democracy becomes significant. Most recipient years, however, record aid above these
thresholds. Models including interactions of the number of democracy donors with
the level of democracy suggest that donor proliferation is effective only for recipients
with lower democracy scores. These models, however, are based on very conservative
lagged dependent variable models and constitute a lower bound for my estimates. Re-
verse models show that the number of democracy donors in the preceding period does
not predict levels of democracy well, providing further support to the hypothesized
causal direction.
Finally, two additional empirical tests shall show whether one can trace the causal mech-
anism more closely with large-n data. First, differentiating aid sectors in more detail
will show whether the effect is actually attributable to (broad and narrow definitions
of) democracy aid, or whether our instrument would produce the same results for any
sector. Table 2 presents results from the IV specification with control variables (model
2, panel B in table 1) with the number of donors in the aid sectors democracy (model 1),
democracy excluding post-conflict aid (2), civil society (3), all sectors excluding democ-
racy (4), health (5), and energy (6). The donor-level instrument for all models is fe-
male legislators, the recipient-level instrument the propensity of receiving aid in the
respective sector over the period 1994 to 2013. As expected, donor proliferation in the
democracy and civil society sectors shows a significant effect of the number of donors on
democracy. Neither economic nor health nor energy donors seem to exert a positive
or substantial influence on democracy, as expected. The empirical results are robust to
these placebo tests.
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Table 3: IV estimates with V-Dem indicators of democratic diversity
Largest party share Party platforms Counterarguments Engaged society CSO environment
No. of dem. donors (est.) −2.43 0.05∗ 0.07 0.04 0.08∗
[−5.19; 0.34] [0.01; 0.09] [−0.00; 0.14] [−0.02; 0.10] [0.03; 0.14]
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Period fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Additional controls no no no no no
# of observations 396 715 715 715 715
# of countries 123 133 133 133 133
R2 0.71 0.96 0.87 0.90 0.90
KP F-statistic 28.81 32.39 32.39 32.39 32.39
*) 95% confidence interval clustered at the country level (in brackets) does not include zero;
dependent variable: V-Dem polyarchy democracy index scaled to a range of [0; 100];
additional controls include population (log), GDP per capita (log) and a civil conflict dummy;
all explanatory variables lagged by one period.
Second, I look at a differentiated outcome variable. We have seen above that democ-
racy aid proliferation results in large number of projects, and that different donors have
different democracy aid portfolios. But does this diversity translate into democratic di-
versity on the recipient side, below the level of aggregate diversity? Table 3 provides
IV results that predict the level of indicators of democratic diversity provided by the
V-Dem project (Coppedge, Gerring, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Andersson,
et al. 2017). The first indicator considered here is the share of seats won by the largest
party.13 One might expect that political diversity increases the chances of parties other
than the largest (and presumably ruling) party in elections. The coefficient is negative,
as expected, but it does not reach significance (model 1). Note that the sample size
decreases by almost 50 percent for this indicator, as data is only recorded for coun-
tries with partisan elections. The number of effective and distinctive party platforms,
however, does increase significantly (model 2). Respect for counterarguments has the
expected positive sign, but does not reach significance (model 3). The same holds for
‘engaged society’, an indicator on how ‘wide and how independent’ public delibera-
tions are (model 4). The ‘the involvement of people in civil society organizations’ that
measures both the diversity and the activity of civil society, however, is again signifi-
cant (model 5). These results supports the notion that donor proliferation improves
democracy by increasing the diversity of political organizations the recipient country.
Electoral results and deliberative practice do not appear to be affected; such an effect
is less credible given the low reach of democracy aid beyond actors that are already
mobilized.
13See online appendix C for exact variable references and additional OLS specifications.
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Tracing the causal mechanism in Ghana
The macro-quantitative evidence provides strong support for my hypothesis. But is
the causal mechanism plausible when being confronted with accounts from actual prac-
tice in democracy aid? In order to conduct this sanity check, I review the effects of
democracy aid in Ghana as reported in the scholarly literature and in donor publica-
tions. Ghana is a donor darling and has improved its democracy scores over the past
two decades. If the mechanism of improving democracy via diversity in democracy
donors is generalizable, Ghana is a likely case where this should be observable (cp. Go-
ertz and Mahoney 2012: 177–191). Online appendix D contains the full case study
and detailed statistics on democracy aid in Ghana. To summarize the results, one can
state that two components of Ghanaian democracy have benefited substantially from the
contributions of individual donors: Dutch aid contributed to the survival of small par-
ties, and German aid contributed to professionalizing free mass media (Gyimah-Boadi
and Yakah 2012; van Breukelen and Magolowondo 2010). Detailed tables on sectoral
aid flows provided in the appendix indicate that both donors entered Ghana before
the positive effects materialized. Dijkstra and Kumado (2004: 15) confirm that Dutch
support provided a unique contribution: ‘[…] everyone interviewed by the evaluators
stressed the uniqueness of the [N]IMD/IEA programme in relation to the interventions
of other development partners in Ghana because of the bilateral programme and the
cross party activities’. In a counterfactual world without these donors’ engagement, it
seems unlikely that other donors would have replaced their activities. Both small par-
ties and free media are crucial in young democracies (cp. Conroy-Krutz and Moehler
2015; Lindberg 2010). Donor proliferation is thus likely to have had a positive causal
effect on democracy in Ghana.
Conclusion
Diversity is both justification of and prerequisite for liberal democracy. This paper
shows – with a range of quantitative models and anecdotal evidence from Ghana – that
diversity provided by a multitude of donors helps improve a recipient country’s democ-
racy. The finding contradicts common wisdom in development studies that donor pro-
liferation and other forms of aid fragmentation have detrimental effects. Insights on
democratization processes suggests why this is not the case for democracy aid: diverse
and participatory processes are more likely to produce sustainable institutions in young
democracies (e.g., Kapstein and Converse 2008; Wright 2008). Different donors pro-
vide different ideas and thus improve trial-and-error processes of democratization.
These findings contribute to the democratization literature: They provide empirical
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support to the surmise that external donors can – to some extent – replace a lack of en-
dogenous funding for various political currents. The findings also contribute to the aid
effectiveness literature by providing a first test on how aid fragmentation modifies the
effects of democracy aid. My diversity hypothesis also resonates well with other research
that disaggregates the effects of democracy promotion efforts. Birchler, Limpach, and
Michaelowa (2016), for example, find that aid provided by the World Bank and the In-
ternational Monetary Fund has positive effects on democratization, if made conditional
on increased participation and accountability.
Immediate implications for development policy arise. My findings caution against un-
critically expanding the division of labor in foreign aid. While economic aid may still be
well-advised to follow the principle of harmonization, it is recommendable tomaintain a
sufficiently diverse donor environment in the area of democracy aid. Non-government
organizations, political parties and independent media providers can be best catered
by a group of donors with various backgrounds in a ‘marketplace for ideas’. But is this
a realistic scenario? A recent survey of policy makers in recipient countries concludes
that it is: recipients frequently and purposefully leverage useful support from different
donors (Parks, Rice, and Custer 2015).
Nobody expects democracy aid alone to create democratic regimes, andmany countries
will suffer setbacks in the future. But democracy aid can help make democracy a little
less defective, and the more experience with participatory governance is accumulated,
the higher the chances for real democracy in the future (cp. Quintelier and Van Deth
2014; Svolik 2013). This process may take long, but evidence presented here and in
other recent publications shows that it may be possible to fast-forward it at least a little
with effective modes of implementing democracy aid. And it is crucial that democracy
aid is effective, as ineffective measures help autocrats build facades of democracy and
consolidate their grip on power (Bader and Faust 2014).
Increasing the number of democracy donors, however, is not a feasible option for all
recipients. The rate of never-takers that reject democracy aid is increasing: Carothers
(2016: 361) observes that while the most authoritarian states have always kept out
democracy support as much as possible, more recently even democratic and semi-
authoritarian regimes such as Ethiopia, India, Russia and Venezuela have begun to
follow suit. They consider democracy aid as ‘foreign political meddling’. By using
propensity to receive democracy aid as a component of my instrumental variable, I
control for this selection bias. It shows that sufficient compliers remain for a positive net
effect, despite authoritarian cocooning. In recipient countries that do allow democracy
aid, the recommended measures are comparatively easy to implement: Donor and
recipient governments have – provided a certain degree of international cooperation –
direct control over the degree of donor proliferation, as opposed to structural variables
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that influence democratization. McFaul (2004: 157) states that there is no blueprint
for democracy promotion, and that ‘many even reject the idea that there can be a
blueprint’. I agree with this analysis, but the present study suggests a ‘meta-blueprint’
instead: keep democracy promotion diverse.
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This file provides additional information on the data and software employed in the
paper More donors, more democracy.
Universe of cases
The universe of cases analyzed is all countries defined by the OECD to be eligible for
receiving Official Development Aid (ODA). Changes in developing country status over
time have been derived from (incomplete) information available on the OECDwebsite.1
Only independent countries as defined by Weidmann, Kuse, and Gleditsch (2010) and
with with more than half a million inhabitants are considered. On the donor side, I
consider all bilateral donors that are OECD members and multilateral donors. This
excludes authoritarian countries such as the United Arab Emirates that recently started
to report to the Creditor Reporting System (CRS) of the OECD.
Description of indicators
Aid indicators
My primary measure of fragmentation is simply the number of donors providing for-
eign aid to the respective recipient country.2 To determine whether a country receives
aid from a particular donor, I draw on the AidData Research Release 3.0 (Tierney et al.
2011). AidData is mainly based on the CRS provided by the Donor Assistance Commit-
tee (DAC) of the OECD (2015). I choose AidData as primary source because it contains
information on former aid recipients that have been removed from the CRS. AidData
also contains some additional project coding. I am using the ‘coalesced purpose codes’
that combine the information of both CRS and additional AidData coding. The data
is available on the project level. In order to remove irrelevant contributions, I do not
count donors as ‘present’ if their reported commitments are less than 100,000 USD in
a year over all projects in the respective sector. This threshold is somewhat arbitrary. I
assume that 100,000 USD would roughly suffice for an international expert employed
in that sector.3 I exclude debt relief, humanitarian aid and aid spent in the donor coun-
tries from all aid variables, since these are unlikely to have direct effects on democracy,
or are driven by external shocks such as natural disasters.
1http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/historyofdaclistsofaidrecipientcountries.htm
2The number of actors as a measure of diversity is also used in related fields: Seymour, Bakke, and
Cunningham (2016: 7–8), for example, employ the number of groups as an indicator of fragmentation
in ethnopolitical movements.
3This would not cover the overhead, of course, but that could come from the general aid budget as
well.
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The sector Government and Civil Society (GCS) roughly captures activities that I define as
democracy aid. It contains institutional support to the state, electoral assistance, and
support to various forms of civil society, including human right groups and media out-
lets. Focusing only on aid that goes to civil society might seem to fit my argument of mul-
tiple recipients better, but this type of aid accounts for only 0.6 percent of total aid in my
sample. Furthermore, much aid that is listed as institutional aid is channeled through
government to civil society actors. The more detailed the information extracted from
AidData, the more likely it is to obtain severely biased data, because reporting habits
vary over time and across donors. Even for one donor it can be troublesome to main-
tain a standard, since the decision whether a particular project should be coded under
a certain category is often ambiguous in practice. Despite these drawbacks, the Aid-
Data provides the most complete information on aid activities available. Employing a
rough measure (number of donors) on a comparatively highly aggregated level (the
GCS sector) helps minimize measurement error. Empirically, logged GCS and civil so-
ciety aid per capita correlate at 0.63, and the results for the base model do not change
substantially when using the latter specification (see online appendix C).
There is also an alternative identifier for democracy-related aid provided by the CRS,
namely the ‘Participatory Development and Good Governance’ (PD/GG) marker. But
this indicator has many missings and overlaps strongly with GCS for the non-missing
data: It lists democracy activity only for two country years in my sample where GCS
does not, but it misses many country years where GCS is reported. The number of ac-
tivities recorded also correlates highly at .94 with the number of GCS activities. Another
alternative is to distinguish types of aid by the channel of delivery: Do the flows go to
government or non-government recipients (cp. Dietrich 2013)? But this distinction is
only available from the year 2004 onward and thus does not lend itself for the present
analysis.
The CRS-based AidData is the most encompassing source on donor activities, but it has
other drawbacks that affect all aid data sources. There is underreporting by donors,
both intentionally and unintentionally (Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2011). Since dis-
bursement records are very incomplete, AidData has focused on collecting aid commit-
ment data in the recent releases.4 Commitments are not necessarily fulfilled, and if they
are, the disbursement may occur several years later; but they provide a decent proxy
for the engagement of a particular donor in the recipient country at a certain point in
time.
Figure A1 provides information on how the number of donors in general aid, democ-
racy aid and economic aid has changed over the time period under study. It shows
4The United States, for example, has been marking aid disbursements with GCS codes only since
2002.
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that the data follows a strong time trend. The number of reported democracy donors
per year in the mid-1990’s was very low, which is one reason not to start the period of
investigation earlier. One should also note that reports in the number of donors un-
derestimate the number of agencies working on the ground, since some donors fund
several different organizations that work independently, such as the German political
foundations.
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Figure A1: Donor proliferation by aid sector, 1994–2013
Democracy indicators
The aid variables are hypothesized to be correlated with changes in democracy. I mea-
sure democracy levels primarily with the polyarchy index provided by the V-Dem project
(version 7.1; Coppedge et al. 2017). V-Dem is a new collection of institutional traits
of all countries in the world since 1900 and provides a more detailed assessment of
democracy than other data sources. It has a near normal distribution and is thus bet-
ter capable of distinguishing countries at the extremes, as opposed to the prominent
Polity IV data (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2016). An additional advantage of pol-
yarchy index is the more fine-grained – in fact, continuous – nature, as opposed to the
ordinal Polity IV scale. As a latent aggregate, the V-Dem polyarchy index is also much
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smoother. This reduces the impact of small and spurious fluctuations in the individual
indicators and helps to identify the general trends. Nonetheless, I use Polity IV, Free-
domHouse and the Unified Democracy Scale to assess the robustness of my results. All
democracy measures are normalized to a 0 to 100 scale to facilitate comparison across
models with different indicators. Since my theory predicts improvements for various
aspects of democracy, I employ an aggregate democracy index as the main dependent
variable. But I also test how donor proliferation affects components of democracy as
measured by V-Dem (see online appendix C for all robustness checks).
Control variable indicators
A set of controls is included in the regressions to account for the presence of compet-
ing factors that could also influence democratization. I include the amount of general
and democracy aid that is spent in order to distinguish effects of aid quantity and aid
fragmentation. Aid quantity is here measured as absolute aid, as the number of donors
is also measured in absolute terms.5 I include population size, per-capita income (both
from Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer 2015) and civil war (Gleditsch et al. 2002).
Summary statistics
Table A1 provides summary statistics for the main dataset employed in the paper. Ob-
servations are recorded at the three-year-period recipient-country level. Table A2 pro-
vides the corresponding correlation matrix. (The row and column numbers in table A2
refer to the indicator names as listed in table A1.) Table A3 provides summary statistics
for the country-year dataset from which higher levels of temporal aggregation were
calculated. Table A4 provides summary statistics for the dyadic dataset with donor-
recipient-year observations from which aid indicators and instrumental variables were
calculated. Note that the rather low mean and median scores for the propensity to
receive aid is partly due to the large number of donors I include in my sample (38, in-
cluding multilateral donors): every donor that does not provide aid from the respective
sector to a particular recipient generates a zero that drives down the average propensity
score. Donors that provide most types of aid to most recipients are few.
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Table A1: Summary statistics: three-year time windows, monadic level, 1994-2012
No. Indicator N Mean Median Std. dev. Min. Max.
1 First year of the time window 895 2,002.64 2,003.00 5.93 1,994.00 2,012.00
2 Last year of the time window 895 2,004.64 2,005.00 5.93 1,996.00 2,014.00
3 Number of donors 895 18.59 20.00 6.08 0.00 33.00
4 No. of democracy donors 895 11.13 11.00 6.22 0.00 31.00
5 No. of economic donors 895 17.88 19.00 6.01 0.00 31.00
6 No. of small dem. donors 895 10.63 10.00 6.35 0.00 29.00
7 Dem. aid fragmentation index 895 0.60 0.68 0.25 0.00 0.91
8 Dem. aid concentration ratio 895 0.79 0.83 0.20 0.00 1.00
9 Aid commitments (million USD) 895 3,152.04 1,281.00 7,211.17 0.00 101,010.51
10 Democracy aid com. (m USD) 895 251.35 90.83 534.00 0.00 7,801.07
11 Economic aid com. (m USD) 895 2,900.69 1,132.85 6,988.40 0.00 98,883.30
12 Aid com. per capita 895 198.55 139.88 218.56 0.00 2,119.19
13 Democracy aid com. p.c. 895 23.22 9.49 57.48 0.00 1,128.91
14 Economic aid com. p.c. 895 175.33 122.61 189.54 0.00 2,038.19
15 Leg. fract. * aid propensity 895 4.82 4.91 2.03 0.00 9.34
16 WiP * democracy aid prop. 895 33.06 30.09 21.34 0.00 107.50
17 Leg. fract. * econ. aid prop. 895 3.95 3.84 1.74 0.00 8.53
18 Leg. fract. * distance (inverted) 895 278.83 276.99 56.94 102.41 422.85
19 WiP * distance (inverted) 895 9,077.71 8,958.62 2,361.06 2,563.69 16,156.21
20 V-Dem polyarchy, rescaled 878 48.60 46.89 25.38 0.03 99.81
21 Polity IV polity2, rescaled 880 60.70 72.92 30.91 0.00 100.00
22 Freedom House, rescaled 895 46.96 47.22 28.24 0.00 100.00
23 Population 895 41.52 9.46 152.19 0.50 1,354.04
24 GDP per capita 866 3,432.22 1,451.23 5,655.08 72.76 53,933.01
25 Civil war 895 0.20 0.00 0.37 0.00 1.00
Democracy aid portfolios
The argument presented in the main text assumes that all donors provide somewhat
different approaches to democratization. I cite some literature that supports this notion
(Dietrich 2016; Magen, Risse, and McFaul 2009), but the AidData project allows me to
investigate the (reported) portfolios of individual donors more closely. Figure A2 shows
in what areas of ‘strengthening civil society’ (CRS code 15150) donors spend their funds;
table A5 reveals the abbreviations used for multilateral donors. I draw on AidData
activity codes. Each project may have several activity codes from very different sectors.
As I cannot assess the importance of the respective codes, I assign the full amount from
a project to each activity code. The figure is a heatmap that compares the relative
contributions of individual donors. Darker shades indicate that a higher share of a
donor’s commitments go to the respective activity. Donors and sectors are rearranged
by similarity to facilitate interpretation. It shows, for example, that there is a group with
a strong focus on human rights. This group includes Sweden, Finland and UNICEF.
Poland even spends all aid in this sub-sector on human rights. Several multilaterals and
Japan focus on community participation. Spain and Iceland focus their contributions
5Robustness checks with per capita aid to capture the relative impact that aid amounts have on a
country are also conducted.
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on women organizations. Other donors spread their funds more broadly, such as the
European Union and the United Kingdom. I conclude that democracy aid portfolios
differ substantially between donors.
Software
All calculations were performed with Microsoft R Open 3.3.2. All package versions as of
a CRAN mirror snapshot taken on 1 November 2016 (see https://mran.microsoft.com
for details).
Packages I employed include car (Fox and Weisberg 2011), clusterSEs (Esarey 2016),
dplyr (Wickham and Francois 2016), ggplot2 (Wickham 2009), gplots (Warnes et al.
2016), interplot (Solt and Hu 2015), lfe (Gaure 2013), MASS (Venables and Ripley
2002), psych (Revelle 2015), texreg (Leifeld 2013), and xtable (Dahl 2014).
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Table A3: Summary statistics: yearly data, monadic level, 1994-2013
Indicator N Mean Median Std. dev. Min. Max.
Year 2,527 2,003.12 2,003.00 5.69 1,994.00 2,013.00
Number of donors 2,527 15.19 16.00 6.20 0.00 31.00
No. of democracy donors 2,527 7.69 7.00 5.47 0.00 29.00
No. of economic donors 2,527 14.42 15.00 6.02 0.00 29.00
No. of small dem. donors 2,527 7.21 6.00 5.71 0.00 28.00
Dem. aid fragmentation index 2,527 0.52 0.59 0.27 0.00 0.92
Dem. aid concentration ratio 2,527 0.82 0.89 0.22 0.00 1.00
Aid commitments (million USD) 2,527 1,114.56 416.44 2,916.44 0.00 62,331.65
Democracy aid com. (m USD) 2,527 88.46 23.82 216.29 0.00 2,940.05
Economic aid com. (m USD) 2,527 1,026.10 359.25 2,848.87 0.00 62,289.99
Aid com. per capita 2,527 67.04 44.13 88.46 0.00 1,763.33
Democracy aid com. p.c. 2,527 7.17 2.35 14.88 0.00 257.19
Economic aid com. p.c. 2,527 59.87 39.00 83.61 0.00 1,761.00
Leg. fract. * aid propensity 2,527 4.49 4.61 2.20 0.00 9.21
WiP * democracy aid prop. 2,527 32.41 29.56 21.05 0.00 106.49
Leg. fract. * econ. aid prop. 2,527 3.67 3.61 1.87 0.00 8.55
Leg. fract. * distance (inverted) 2,527 254.08 261.26 76.05 0.00 411.71
WiP * distance (inverted) 2,527 8,563.03 8,449.61 2,193.16 2,267.62 15,573.27
V-Dem polyarchy, rescaled 2,477 48.24 46.64 25.64 0.00 100.00
Polity IV polity2, rescaled 2,476 60.17 75.00 31.39 0.00 100.00
Freedom House, rescaled 2,527 46.61 50.00 28.45 0.00 100.00
Population 2,527 41.73 9.50 152.29 0.50 1,357.38
GDP per capita 2,432 3,433.47 1,405.12 5,761.27 69.58 56,586.17
Civil war 2,527 0.21 0.00 0.41 0.00 1.00
Table A4: Summary statistics: yearly data (dyadic level), 1994-2003
Indicator N Mean Median Std. dev. Min. Max.
Year 21,092 1,998.53 2,000.00 3.34 1,994.00 2,003.00
Prop. of receiving aid (recipient) 21,092 0.21 0.00 0.28 0.00 1.00
Prop. of rec. democracy aid (rec.) 21,092 0.03 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.70
Prop. of rec. economic aid (rec.) 21,092 0.19 0.00 0.26 0.00 1.00
Donor-recip. distance (1000 km, inv.) 21,092 12.16 12.39 4.08 0.00 19.53
Women in parliament (donor) 20,450 19.85 17.87 10.62 2.20 45.20
Legislative fractionalization (don.) 20,294 0.68 0.68 0.10 0.44 0.90
Aid > 100,000 USD 21,092 0.44 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00
Democracy aid > 100,000 USD 21,092 0.21 0.00 0.41 0.00 1.00
Economic aid > 100,000 USD 21,092 0.43 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00
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Figure A2: Civil soceity aid portfolios of donors, 1994–2013 (AidData activity codes);
relative distributions by donor: darkest color indicates that more than 50 percent of aid
is spent on that activity
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Table A5: Abbreviations used in figure A2
abbrmulti namemulti
AFDB African Development Bank
ASDB Asian Development Bank
EU European Communities
IADB Inter-American Development Bank
IBRD World Bank - International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IDA World Bank - International Development Association
OFID OPEC Fund for International Development
OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
UNAIDS Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNECE United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
UNFPA United Nations Population Fund
UNICEF United Nations Children‘s Fund
UNPBF United Nations Peacebuilding Fund
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Identification strategy
This appendix provides additional information on the instrumental variable approach
employed in the paper. I employ two strategies to construct the instrumental variable:
interaction on the dyadic level, as shown in the paper, and the estimation of the number
of donors on the dyadic level via a zero stage. The latter is described in the validation
section of this appendix. Both strategies employ a recipient-side and a donor-side in-
strument, which are interacted on the dyadic level for both approaches. As instruments
on the donor side, I employ two alternative indicators: the propensity to receive aid in
the respective sector over the whole time period under study, and the distance between
donor and recipient country. The following pages describe in detail how I modified
my precursors’ approaches to fit my research question.1
As argued in the paper, I follow recent suggestions to interact exogenous variables on
the donor side with recipient properties in order to increase cross-sectional variance
(e.g., Ahmed and Werker 2015; Dietrich and Wright 2015; Dreher and Langlotz 2015;
Galiani et al. 2017; Nunn and Qian 2014: 1631). This is what I call the ‘interaction
approach’. I estimate the level of democracy Y in recipient country i at time t with the
following equation:
Yit = β1Dˆit−1 + β2Xit−1 + αi + τt + ϑit,
where Dˆ is the estimated number of donors, X a vector of control variables, α country
fixed effects, τ period fixed effects and ϑ the error term. This equation constitutes the
second stage of a two-stage least-squares (2SLS) model. D is estimated in a first stage
using the interacted instrument Z and the same set of control variables and country and
period fixed effects, as well as an error term κ:
Dit−1 = δ1Zit−1 + δ2Xit−1 + αi + τt + κijt,
Z is calculated on the dyadic level, with donor-recipient years as unit of observation,
and aggregated by summing over all donors for each recipient year:
Zit =
N∑
j=1
(Qjt ∗ Kij),
where Q is the donor-level instrument varying by donor j and time. K is the recipient-
level instrument, varying by donor and recipient.ˆ
1Some of the following paragraphs are duplicates from the main paper. I repeat this information
here because it is a prerequisite to understand to following, more detailed arguments on the validity of
my identification strategy.
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Note that Kij in time-invariant, whereas Qjt is recipient-invariant. Combined with coun-
try and period fixed effects, there is no need to include the constitutive terms of the
interaction in the first stage. More importantly, including fixed effects deals with the
exogenous component of the interaction and reduces the demands on the identifying
assumption: I must only assume that the level of democracy in countries with different
propensities to receive democracy aid will be equally affected by changes in the share
of women in the donor parliament if they have the same number of democracy donors,
conditional on the other control variables (Ahmed 2016: 196; cp. Dreher and Lan-
glotz 2015: 8–9).2 The propensity indicator thus cannot exert an independent effect
on democracy contaminated by endogeneity.
Instrumental variables
Mymain donor instrument Q applied to the democracy donor proliferation is the share
of female legislators. Dietrich andWright (2015, in their online appendix C) argue, build-
ing on Breuning (2001), that women are more likely to support social-equity issues and
show empirically that the share of female legislators is a good predictor of democracy
aid. The instrument is plausibly excludable: There is no reason to believe that the gen-
der composition of a donor country’s parliament should affect democracy in a recipient
country directly. Dietrich andWright (2015: 224) also show that alternative paths from
female legislators to democracy are unlikely, given low bivariate correlations with trade,
immigration, membership in international organizations, alliances and NGO presence.
For economic and general aid proliferation, donor instrument Q is legislative fraction-
alization, defined as ‘the probability that two deputies picked at random from the leg-
islature will be of different parties’ (Beck et al. 2001: 174). Ahmed (2016: 191–193)
suggests this indicator as an instrument for aid flows and shows that the U.S. House
of Representatives passes larger foreign aid budgets when it is fractionalized. Dreher
and Langlotz (2015) also employ government and legislative fractionalization as their
donor instrument.
On the recipient side, K is the share of years in which a recipient receives aid in the
respective sector. Nunn and Qian (2014) suggest this ‘propensity’ instrument, which is
also used by Dreher and Langlotz (2015) and Ahmed (2016). More formally, propensity
Kprop is defined as the share of years k in the examined time range in which a recipient
receives aid from a particular donor that exceeds threshold h:
2See Nizalova and Murtazashvili (2016) for a formal proof for the case of combining exogenous treat-
ments with endogenous factors.
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Kpropij =
∑
k qijk
max(k)− min(k) ,
qijk =
1 if Aijk > h0 if Aijk ≤ h .
As in the donor proliferation variable (described in themain paper and online appendix
A), I set threshold h to 100,000 USD, as lower amounts would certainly not suffice to
provide for an actual presence of that donor.
I also test my hypotheses with an alternative recipient-level instrument suggested by Di-
etrich and Wright (2015: 224), who employ the inverted share of the distance between
donor and recipient for K. I modify the approach by only inverting the distance, but
dispensing from standardizing it to relative distances, as I expect the probability of a
particular donor to cater a recipient country to be a function of absolute distance. This
conforms to the specifications employed in most aid allocation studies.
To measure the share of female legislators, I use data from Paxton, Hughes, and Green
(2006), provided and updated by the V-Dem project (Coppedge et al. 2017). Data on
legislative fractionalization comes from the Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al.
2001). Distance data is calculated from the cshapes package (Weidmann, Kuse, and
Gleditsch 2010). Online appendix A provides summary statistics and more detailed
information on all data employed. Online appendix B provides more information on
the instrumental variable approach.
In order to apply the donor-side instruments to multilateral donors, I follow Dietrich
and Wright (2015 replication files) and use the average share of female legislators in
the largest stakeholders of the respective organizations. For the distance instrument, I
employ the distance to the capital of the host country of the multilateral donor. The
multilateral donors considered comprise the European Bank for Reconstruction & De-
velopment (EBRD), the European Union (EU), the Inter-American Development Bank
(IDB), the InternationalMonetary Fund (IMF), as well as threeWorld Bank units which
have different stakeholder compositions: the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (IBRD), the International Development Association (IDA), and the
International Finance Corporation (IFC). Moreover, 14 United Nations (UN) organiza-
tions are considered, all with the same instrument on the donor side. Table B1 presents
the stakeholders and locations for these multilateral donors. Note that all results hold
when excluding multilateral donors, thus the assumptions induced here are not essen-
tial for my substantive conclusions.
B-4
Table B1: Stakeholders and approximate locations of multilateral donors
Multilateral donor Largest stakeholders Location (approx.)
EU Germany, France, United Kingdom Brussels
IDA USA, Japan, United Kingdom Washington, D.C.
IFC USA, Japan, Germany Washington, D.C.
IBRD USA, Japan, China Washington, D.C.
UN USA, China, Russia, France, United Kingdom Washington, D.C.
IDB USA Washington, D.C.
IMF USA, Japan, Germany Washington, D.C.
EBRD USA, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, France London
Validation
Scatterplots
To validate my approach, I first show that my main instrumental variables are related –
positively and roughly linearly – to the explanatory variable of interest, the number of
democracy donors. In figure B1, it becomes evident that the share of female legislators
in a donor country is related to the number of recipient countries which this donor pro-
vides with democracy aid, when aggregated to the donor-period level. Note that both
a linear regression (green line) and a smoothing spline (red curve) suggest a positive
correlation (0.32, p-value < 0.000). This supports the idea of using female legislators as
‘donor instrument’ Q for the number of democracy donors. The propensity to receive
democracy aid over the period 1994 to 2013 constitutes the ‘recipient instrument’ K.
Figure B2 shows that K is related to the number of donors that provide democracy to
a recipient in a particular time period, when aggregated to the recipient-period level
(0.67, p-value < 0.000). Figure B3, again at the recipient-period level, shows that the
interacted instrument correlates strongly with the number of democracy donors (0.74,
p-value < 0.000).
Temporal variation of the instrument
The interacted instrument combines temporal and cross-sectional variation from two
different variables. The temporal variation comes from the share of female legisla-
tors in donors countries. This number changes only with electoral cycles in the donor
countries, which last four or five years in most cases. Electoral cycles overlap between
donors, but one might nonetheless suspect that temporal variation is insufficient for my
instrumentation strategy. Figure B4 shows how the share of female legislators varied
in OECD countries between 1994 and 2013. A positive time trend is apparent in most
countries, but the increase is not monotonous (see also figure B5 which plots the differ-
ences from year to year). Aggregated to three-year time windows that I employ as my
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Figure B1: Share of female legislators and number of recipients provided with democ-
racy aid (three-year donor periods, 1994–2013)
main specification, the patterns are obviously smoother, but they maintain substantial
amounts of variation.
Reduced form estimates
Table B2 provides the results of the reduced form estimates of models 1 to 5 from the
main results table. As expected, the interaction of women in the donor parliament with
the propensity to receive democracy aid over the whole period under investigation is a
good predictor of democracy (model 1). The relationship holds when adding controls
(model 2), including economic aid proliferation and amounts (model 3). The interac-
tion of legislative fractionalization in the donor country with the propensity to receive
general aid is not a good predictor of democracy (model 4), which is in line with my
argument that the causal channel goes through democracy aid.
Instrumenting proliferation or aid amounts?
The literature that inspires my identification strategy is interested in the effects of the
amount of aid, and not, as I am, of the number of donors. I thus assess here whether my
strategy actually predicts the number of democracy donors, or whether it predicts aid
amounts instead. Table B3 shows what happens when the interaction approach with
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Figure B2: Propensity to receive democracy aid(three-year recipient periods, 1994–
2013)
female legislators as the donor instrument and propensity to receive democracy aid
as the recipient instrument is used to instrument the number of democracy donors
(models 1 and 2; these are equivalent to model 2, panels C and B in table 1 in the
paper), absolute democracy aid amounts (models 3 and 4) and democracy aid per capita
(models 5 and 6). Looking at the Kleibergen-Paap (KP) F-statistic of 32 for model 2, it
becomes clear that the interacted instrument is suitable for the number of donors. For
absolute democracy aid amounts, the KP F-statistic drops to about 4 (model 4), and for
democracy aid per capita, the model breaks down and produces a KP F-statistic near
zero and very large estimates (re-scaled by a factor of 1/1000 for presentation purposes;
see model 6).
Table B4 reproduces the same scenario with the inverted distance between donor and
recipient capitals as recipient instrument K, as suggested by Dietrich andWright (2015).
A similar pattern emerges, with the exception of per-capita democracy aid (models 5
and 6). Here, the KP F-statistic of around 6 could be considered just sufficient. The
instrumented variable also produces statistically significant effects on the second stage.
This is in line with the application of Dietrich and Wright (2015). They further corrob-
orate their results by using ‘inside’ instruments which relax the exogeneity assumption
(Lewbel 2012). Since I employ a range of alternative specifications, and I have evidence
that their modified instrument is sufficiently strong for donor proliferation, I refrain
from this approach. The KP F-statistic of 16 for using this instrument on the number of
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Figure B3: Interacted instrument and number of democracy donors (three-year aver-
ages, 1994–2013)
democracy donors generates more confidence than the KP F-statistic of 6 for democracy
aid per capita.
Sector-specificity of the instruments
Table 2 in the paper (replicated below as table B5) uses the interaction approach to
instrument various aid sectors and assesses whether they produce comparable effects
on democracy. I find that only governance aid sectors generate statistically significant
effects, and other sectors such as economic aid, health aid and energy aid do not. This
increases my trust in the specificity of my instrument.
Adding a zero stage
Instead of simply aggregating the dyadic instrument onto the monadic level, Dreher
and Langlotz (2015) employ a ‘zero-stage’ to explicitly model the expected amount of
aid. They adapt the idea of a zero-stage from Frankel and Romer (1999) and estimate
the amount of aid that a recipient receives from a particular donor in a particular year
on the dyadic level from the interaction used above:
Aidijt = γ1Qjt ∗ Kij + εijt,
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Table B2: Donor proliferation and democracy, full reduced form estimates
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Z (WiP * Pr(dem. aid)) 0.94∗ 0.97∗ 0.83∗
[0.49; 1.38] [0.54; 1.39] [0.38; 1.27]
Democracy aid (m USD; log) 2.08∗ 1.64∗
[0.42; 3.75] [0.24; 3.03]
Number of economic donors 0.17
[−0.32; 0.66]
Economic aid (m USD; log) 3.06
[−0.11; 6.23]
Z (leg. frac. * Pr(aid)) 5.66
[−1.46; 12.78]
Aid (m USD; log) 5.45∗
[1.86; 9.03]
Pop. (log) x 10 −0.43 −0.85 0.35
[−5.44; 4.59] [−5.88; 4.18] [−5.21; 5.90]
GDP p.c. (log) x 10 −1.05 −1.00 −0.21
[−2.42; 0.31] [−2.38; 0.38] [−1.68; 1.26]
Civil conflict −2.00 −2.13 −3.04
[−7.33; 3.34] [−7.18; 2.92] [−8.15; 2.08]
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Period fixed effects yes yes yes yes
# of observations 715 715 715 715
# of countries 133 133 133 133
R2 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93
*) 95% confidence interval clustered at the country level (in brackets) does not include zero;
dependent variable: V-Dem polyarchy democracy index scaled to a range of [0; 100];
all explanatory variables lagged by one period.
where Aid is the amount of aid given by donor j to recipient i at time t. The estimated
amount is then summed to the recipient-period level and employed as the instrument
on the first stage. In a balanced sample, both approaches are equivalent. As my sample
is not balanced, and one might prefer a more intuitive modeling of the number of
donors rather than the immediate application of the interaction term in the first stage,
I adapt their approach to estimate the number of donors present in a recipient country
in a particular time period. First, I use logistic regression on the donor-recipient-period
level to estimate the probability that a donor is present:
Pr(Aidijt > 0|Qjt,Kij) = 11+ exp(γ1Qjt ∗ Kij) .
My instrument on the first stage is then the sum of these probabilities:
Zzeroit =
n∑
j=1
Pr(Aidijt > 0|Qjt,Kij).
The first and second stages are then equivalent to the interaction effects described above,
with only slightly different estimates for D.
Table B6 replicates table 1 from the main article with a zero-stage added to the models
that employ propensity as recipient instrument. The zero-stage estimates are provided
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Table B3: Instrumenting the number of donors (models 1&2), aid amounts (3&4), or
aid per capita (5&6) with propensity
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Z (WiP * Pr(dem. aid)) x 1/10 3.56∗ −0.34∗ 0.01
[2.38; 4.75] [−0.64; −0.05] [−0.12; 0.14]
No. of dem. donors (est.) 2.72∗
[1.42; 4.02]
Dem. aid (m USD; log) (est.) −19.41
[−41.90; 3.08]
Dem. aid (USD p.c.; log) (est.) 0.85
[−12.96; 14.66]
No. of dem. donors 0.08∗ 2.40∗ 0.06∗ −0.05
[0.06; 0.11] [0.58; 4.22] [0.04; 0.08] [−0.86; 0.76]
Dem. aid (m USD; log) 0.99∗ −0.60
[0.33; 1.64] [−2.13; 0.93]
Pop. (log) x 10 0.33 −1.32 0.18 3.06 −0.09 0.07
[−0.88; 1.54] [−6.62; 3.99] [−0.03; 0.39] [−4.78; 10.91] [−0.22; 0.05] [−1.16; 1.31]
GDP p.c. (log) x 10 0.16 −1.50 0.03 −0.50 0.01 −0.01
[−0.30; 0.63] [−3.25; 0.24] [−0.04; 0.10] [−2.72; 1.72] [−0.03; 0.05] [−0.09; 0.08]
Civil conflict 0.26 −2.69 0.04 −1.26 −0.04 0.03
[−1.18; 1.70] [−7.07; 1.68] [−0.23; 0.32] [−9.03; 6.51] [−0.19; 0.10] [−0.54; 0.61]
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Period fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Additional controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
# of observations 715 715 715 715 715 715
# of countries 133 133 133 133 133 133
R2 0.90 0.91 0.76 0.73 0.80 -72.91
KP F-statistic 34.68 5.11 0.01
*) 95% confidence interval clustered at the country level (in brackets) does not include zero;
dependent variable: V-Dem polyarchy democracy index scaled to a range of [0; 100];
additional controls include population (log), GDP per capita (log) and a civil conflict dummy;
dependent variable in model 6 rescaled by 1/1000 for presentation purposes;
all explanatory variables lagged by one period.
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Table B4: Instrumenting the number of donors (models 1&2), aid amounts (3&4), or
aid per capita (5&6) with distance
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Z (WiP * inv. dist.) x 1/1000 2.14∗ 0.17 0.14∗
[1.15; 3.13] [−0.04; 0.38] [0.03; 0.25]
No. of dem. donors (est.) 3.39∗
[1.24; 5.55]
Dem. aid (m USD; log) (est.) 34.83
[−11.85; 81.50]
Dem. aid (USD p.c.; log) (est.) 41.71∗
[3.47; 79.95]
No. of dem. donors 0.06∗ −1.41 0.05∗ −1.40
[0.04; 0.09] [−4.51; 1.69] [0.04; 0.07] [−3.59; 0.78]
Dem. aid (m USD; log) 0.80∗ −1.24
[0.18; 1.43] [−3.53; 1.04]
Pop. (log) x 10 0.87 −2.03 0.11 −3.62 −0.09 4.26
[−0.36; 2.11] [−7.99; 3.94] [−0.08; 0.31] [−12.29; 5.05] [−0.23; 0.04] [−3.85; 12.37]
GDP p.c. (log) x 10 0.25 −1.81 −0.00 −1.05 −0.00 −0.94
[−0.26; 0.77] [−3.81; 0.20] [−0.07; 0.06] [−3.27; 1.17] [−0.04; 0.04] [−2.72; 0.84]
Civil conflict −0.35 −2.54 0.08 −6.13 −0.05 −1.18
[−1.70; 1.00] [−7.17; 2.10] [−0.21; 0.36] [−16.06; 3.81] [−0.20; 0.10] [−8.13; 5.77]
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Period fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Additional controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
# of observations 715 715 715 715 715 715
# of countries 133 133 133 133 133 133
R2 0.90 0.89 0.76 0.38 0.80 0.79
KP F-statistic 18.02 2.38 6.01
*) 95% confidence interval clustered at the country level (in brackets) does not include zero;
dependent variable: V-Dem polyarchy democracy index scaled to a range of [0; 100];
additional controls include population (log), GDP per capita (log) and a civil conflict dummy;
all explanatory variables lagged by one period.
Table B5: IV estimates with alternative and ’placebo’ sectors
Democracy Democracy, no PB Civil society Economic Health Energy
No. of donors (est.) 2.72∗ 4.25∗ 2.63∗ −3.08 −1.06 −0.41
[1.42; 4.02] [0.97; 7.53] [0.87; 4.39] [−14.75; 8.59] [−5.42; 3.30] [−4.54; 3.72]
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Period fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Additional controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
# of observations 715 715 715 715 715 715
# of countries 133 133 133 133 133 133
R2 0.91 0.86 0.91 0.87 0.91 0.92
KP F-statistic 34.68 6.55 16.16 0.95 6.36 7.43
*) 95% confidence interval clustered at the country level (in brackets) does not include zero;
dependent variable: V-Dem polyarchy democracy index scaled to a range of [0; 100];
additional controls include population (log), GDP per capita (log) and a civil conflict dummy;
all explanatory variables lagged by one period.
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in panel D. Models 1, 2 and 4a are equivalent and predict democracy donor prolifer-
ation with the interaction term of the share of women in donor legislatures and the
propensity to receive democracy aid in the overall sample period 1994 to 2013. Model
4b predicts economic donor proliferation with the interaction term of legislative frac-
tionalization in the donor country and the propensity to receive economic aid. Model
5 predicts general donor proliferation with the interaction term of legislative fraction-
alization in the donor country and the propensity to receive general aid. Model 3 does
not include a zero stage, as it follows the Dietrich and Wright (2015) approach with
a distance instrument. All zero-stage models suggest that the interaction terms of the
respective donor-level and recipient-level instruments contribute significantly to pre-
dicting the presence of a donor in the respective sector. The sums of the estimated
probabilities per recipient year are employed as instrumental variables in the first stages
of models 1, 2, 4 and 5 (panel C). The estimates point estimates and confidence intervals
for the coefficients are almost identical to those of table 1 in the main text.
Table B7 compares the results of the core IV models with and without zero stage side-
by-side. The most salient difference is that the zero-stage model with controls has a
somewhat smaller KP F-statistic and a somewhat larger point estimate. The general
interpretation is almost identical. Figure B6 provides a scatter plot of both first-stage
instruments. It shows that they covary strongly (R2 = 0.96), with virtually no extreme
outliers.
Discussing the assumptions
The main assumptions underlying the IV approach are discussed in the paper. Here,
I will expand on the monotonicity assumption (Sovey and Green 2011: 199), which re-
quires additional explanation due to the unusual nature of the interacted instrumental
variable: the instruments are measured on the dyadic level, while the effect is estimated
on the monadic level. Moreover, instruments, treatments and outcomes are continu-
ous.
The assumption of monotonicity requires that the instrument does not produce any
defiers. Defiers are, in potential-outcomes terminology, defined as subjects that do the
opposite of what the incentive provided by the instrument suggests them to do.3 Com-
pliers are those cases that behave according to the incentive received through the in-
strument. Always-takers accept the treatment independent of the incentive; never-takers
reject it independent of the incentive. Only if no defiers exist, and some compliers do
exist, can the effect of the instrumented explanatory variable on the outcome be inter-
3See Morgan and Winship (2015: 305–324) for a discussion of the potential-outcomes terminology.
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Table B6: Donor proliferation and democracy; estimated with a zero-stage
Dependent variable (panels A and B): democracy
(1) (2) (3) (4a) (4b) (5)
Aid sector: democracy democracy democracy democracy & economic general
Panel A: OLS estimates
Sector donor prolif. 1.03∗ 0.96∗ 0.96∗ 0.84∗ 0.02 0.49
[0.52; 1.54] [0.47; 1.46] [0.47; 1.46] [0.32; 1.37] [−0.51; 0.55] [−0.08; 1.06]
Sector aid (log) 1.09 1.09 0.79 3.51∗ 5.21∗
[−0.15; 2.32] [−0.15; 2.32] [−0.37; 1.95] [0.79; 6.24] [1.89; 8.53]
R2 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93
Panel B: 2SLS estimates
Sector donor prolif. (est.) 2.73∗ 2.86∗ 3.39∗ 1.88∗ 1.03 1.20
[1.45; 4.00] [1.52; 4.21] [1.24; 5.55] [0.24; 3.52] [−0.64; 2.70] [−0.43; 2.83]
Sector aid (log) −0.73 −1.24 −0.22 −0.70 3.28
[−2.34; 0.87] [−3.53; 1.04] [−1.74; 1.30] [−3.97; 2.58] [−1.55; 8.11]
R2 0.91 0.91 0.89 0.92 0.93
Dependent variable (panel C): sector donor proliferation
Panel C: First-stage estimates (for panel B)
IV democr. donor prolif. 2.93∗ 2.76∗ 0.21∗† 3.22∗ 1.33∗
[1.96; 3.90] [1.79; 3.72] [0.12; 0.31] [2.30; 4.13] [0.60; 2.07]
IV econ. donor prolif. −0.77∗ 0.84∗
[−1.23; −0.32] [0.43; 1.26]
IV general donor prolif. 1.11∗
[0.75; 1.48]
Democracy aid (log) 0.91∗ 0.80∗ 0.88∗ 0.18
[0.32; 1.49] [0.18; 1.43] [0.36; 1.40] [−0.06; 0.43]
Economic aid (log) 1.23∗ 1.29∗
[0.04; 2.43] [0.52; 2.06]
General aid (log) 1.82∗
[0.76; 2.89]
KP F-statistic 34.99 31.05 18.02 24.32 31.45 35.51
IV type zero stage zero stage interaction zero stage zero stage zero stage
Donor IV WiP WiP WiP WiP Leg. fract. Leg. fract.
Recipient IV prop. prop. dist. prop. prop. prop.
Control variables (panels A, B and C):
Covariates no yes yes yes yes
Observations
(panels A, B and C) 715 715 715 715 715
Recipients (all panels) 133 133 133 133 133
Dependent variable (panel D): Aidsector > 100,000 USD
Panel D: zero-stage logistic regression estimates (for panel C)
Donor * recipient IV 0.73∗ 0.73∗ − 0.73∗ 27.25∗ 23.12∗
[0.67; 0.80] [0.67; 0.80] − [0.67; 0.80] [26.09; 28.40] [22.14; 24.09]
Pseudo R2 0.28 0.28 − 0.28 0.71 0.72
Dyads (panel D) 5, 239 5, 239 − 5,239 5, 239
Obs. (panel D) 19, 712 19, 712 19,712 19, 712
∗) 95-percent confidence interval does not include zero [confidence intervals in brackets; clustered by recipient country].
†) coefficient and confidence interval scaled by factor 100 for presentation purposes.
Observation unit is a country three-year period. All explanatory variables in panels A, B and C are lagged by one
period. All models include country and year fixed effects. Covariates include population (log), GDP per capita (log),
and civil conflict (dummy).
Abbreviations and definitions: IV: instrumental variable; (est.) donor prolif.: (estimated) donor proliferation, i.e.,
number of donors providing more than 100,000 USD in a given year; KP: Kleibergen-Paap; WiP: share of women in
donor parliament; leg. fract.: legislative fractionalization; propensity: propensity to receive aid in the respective sector
within the overall time period; distance: distance between donor and recipient capitals in 1,000 kilometers, inverted.
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Table B7: IV estimates with (models 2&4) and witout (1&3) zero stage
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
No. of dem. donors (est.) 2.58∗ 2.73∗ 2.72∗ 2.86∗
[1.26; 3.91] [1.45; 4.00] [1.42; 4.02] [1.52; 4.21]
Dem. aid (m USD; log) −0.60 −0.73
[−2.13; 0.93] [−2.34; 0.87]
Pop. (log) x 10 −1.32 −1.47
[−6.62; 3.99] [−7.18; 4.25]
GDP p.c. (log) x 10 −1.50 −1.57
[−3.25; 0.24] [−3.34; 0.21]
Civil conflict −2.69 −2.66
[−7.07; 1.68] [−7.10; 1.77]
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Period fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Additional controls no no yes yes
# of observations 715 715 715 715
# of countries 133 133 133 133
R2 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91
KP F-statistic 32.39 34.99 34.68 31.05
*) 95% confidence interval clustered at the country level (in brackets) does not include zero;
dependent variable: V-Dem polyarchy democracy index scaled to a range of [0; 100];
additional controls include population (log), GDP per capita (log) and a civil conflict dummy;
all explanatory variables lagged by one period.
preted as a causal effect. In practice, however, while one can observe which cases took
the treatment after an incentive, one usually cannot tell whether they are compliers
or always-takers. Accordingly, while one can observe which cases rejected the treat-
ment after not being incentivized, one usually cannot tell whether they are compliers
or never-takers. It is thus a theoretical task to argue that the monotonicity assumption
is met (‘there are no defiers’), and what cases the local average treatment effect (LATE)
actually covers (‘who are the compliers?’).
I refer to instrument Q as the ‘donor instrument’, and instrument K as the ‘recipient
instrument’, as this is where the indicators vary on the dyadic level. However, better
understanding whether and how these instruments affect both parties of the donor-
recipient dyad is prerequisite to assessing the validity of my claims that the interaction
approach works for instrumenting democracy aid proliferation. Tables B8 to B9 dissect
how both components of my instrument affect recipient and donor countries. Table
B10 then shows how these effects aggregate to the dyadic level. The intention of these
table is to show that compliers are likely to exist, while defiers are unlikely to exist.
Table B8 provides an overview of the potential outcomes that the instrument ‘share of
female legislators in the donor country’ (Qj) causes in recipient and donor countries.
Note that for this illustration I must simplify the continuous instrument to one group
of ‘incentivized’ and one of ‘non-incentivized’ cases. I do so by distinguishing a group
of observations where the share of female legislators in the donor parliament has in-
creased (∆Qj > 0), and one where it has not (∆Qj ≤ 0). The second criterion for
distinguishing potential outcomes is then whether a donor actually is present in the
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respective recipient country at a specific point in time or not – the treatment I am inter-
ested in. As discussed in the paper, I consider a donor to be ‘present’ if it commits to
at least 100,000 USD per year in democracy aid. Applying these two criteria, I obtain
four quadrants representing the potential outcome types.
The donor never-taker just does not provide democracy aid, regardless of the share
of legislators in the donor country. The recipient never-taker simply rejects admitting
democracy aid, regardless of the share of legislators in the donor country. Both are
likely scenarios. For always-takers, the situation is analogous: both donor and recipi-
ent always-takers are very likely to exist. Donor compliers are quite likely to exist, as
argued in the paper: female legislators have been shown to have a preference for ‘good’
aid (Breuning 2001; Dietrich and Wright 2015). On the reverse side, this means that
donors with less female legislators are on average less likely to extend democracy aid,
ceteris paribus. A complier on the recipient level would be a country that accepts democ-
racy aid only if this aid was sponsored by female legislators, and that rejects democracy
aid only if it was not sponsored by female legislators. It would require a large amount
of imagination to construct such situations. Recipient compliers are thus unlikely to
exist. Do defiers exist? Donor defiers would be countries where female legislators are
opposed to democracy aid, or where male legislators are disproportionately in favor of
democracy aid. I cannot exclude this possibility for sure, but the aggregation process to
monadic observations should level out such unlikely deviations. Recipients that would
reject democracy aid only because it was sponsored by female legislators are hard to
imagine. Those countries with the lowest esteem for female participation are autoc-
racies that would anyway fall within the group of never-takers. The reverse idea of
recipients only accepting aid when less women are present in the donor’s parliament is
similarly outrageous.
Table B9 provides an overview of the potential outcomes that the instrument ‘propen-
sity of democracy aid commitments’ (Kij) causes in recipient and donor countries. A
non-incentive is here defined as ‘almost no propensity’ (Kij ≈ 0), an incentive through
the instrument as ‘high propensity’ (Kij ≫ 0) – a necessary simplification that allows deal-
ing with the continuous instrument. With the propensity instrument, both never-takers
and always-takers are rather unlikely to occur: aid provision is very path-dependent,
and if either donors or recipients have preferences or aversions (proxied by propensity),
these are likely to persist. For that same reason, compliers exist with a high probabil-
ity, and defiers are unlikely. Note that the ‘strength’ of the propensity instrument is
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Table B8: Potential outcomes of the female legislators instrument on the dyadic level
∆Qjt > 0
DemAidijt < 100, 000 USD DemAidijt > 100, 000 USD
never-taker: complier:
D
em
Ai
d i
jt
<
10
0,
00
0
U
SD
donor:
withholds democracy aid
regardless of the share of
female legislators
(likely scenario)
donor:
offers democracy aid only if
share of female legislators in
donor country is high,
withholds democracy aid only if
share of female legislators in
donor country is low
(likely scenario)
∆
Q
jt
≤
0
recipient:
rejects democracy aid
regardless of the share of
female legislators in donor
country
(likely scenario)
recipient:
accepts democracy aid only if
share of female legislators in
donor country is high, rejects
democracy aid only if share of
female legislators in donor
country is low
(unlikely scenario)
defier: always-taker:
D
em
Ai
d i
jt
>
10
0,
00
0
U
SD
donor:
withholds democracy aid only if
share of female legislators in
donor country is high, offers
democracy aid only if share of
female legislators in donor
country is low
(unlikely scenario)
donor:
offers democracy aid regardless
of the share of female legislators
(likely scenario)
recipient:
rejects democracy aid only if
share of female legislators in
donor country is high, accepts
democracy aid only if share of
female legislators in donor
country is low
(unlikely scenario)
recipient:
accepts democracy aid
regardless of the share of
female legislators in donor
country
(likely scenario)
Qjt: share of female legislators in donor j at time t
DemAidijt: amount of democracy aid that recipient i receives aid from donor j at time t
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in part due to its endogeneity. But this endogeneity is removed from the final instru-
mental variable by the interaction with an exogenous instrument Q in combination with
country fixed effects.
Table B10 brings both instruments together and summarizes their theorized effects
on the monadic level, i.e., the recipient-period unit. But how are the effects of the
two instruments best aggregated? One can imagine the process as a game with several
rounds. In a first round, the donor experiences an increase in instrument Q, or not
(column 2). In a second round, the donor can either offer aid, or not (column 3). This
provides us with information on the potential outcome types on the donor side, as laid
out in table B8 (column 4). In a third round, the recipient is confronted with recipient
instrument K (column 5). As noted above, this stage is somewhat artificial and serves
mainly the purpose of introducing variance across recipients and allowing the use of
country fixed effects. The only likely reaction of the recipient on this stage is compliance
(column 7). The interaction between donor offer and recipient acceptance produces
the outcome on the monad level, i.e., the number of donors D (column 8). I aggregate
the compliance of donors and recipients with these rules: I only consider compliance
types that were judged to be likely in tables B8 and B9; the recipient’s decision trumps
the donor’s decision if they are incompatible, as the former succeeds the latter; and if
at least one of the parties only allows the conclusion that we have a complier and the
outcome is according to the incentive, the monad is considered a complier. Note that
while in tables B8 and B9 I discuss the effects of both instruments on both donor and
recipient for capturing the whole picture, the synthesis focuses on the donor reaction
to instrument Q and on the recipient reaction to instrument K, as this is the variation
across donors and over time that I exploit in the first stage.
Looking at the potential configurations, cases 1 and 6 show that if the donor does not
offer aid, the recipient cannot play. This reduces the total number of configurations
to ten. In case 1, where the instrument suggests not giving democracy aid, we can-
not tell whether the donor is a never-taker or a complier. This carries through to the
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Table B9: Potential outcomes of the propensity instrument on the dyadic level
Kij ≫ 0
DemAidijt < 100, 000 USD DemAidijt > 100, 000 USD
never-taker: complier:
D
em
Ai
d i
jt
<
10
0,
00
0
U
SD
donor:
withholds democracy aid
regardless of the propensity to
provide democracy aid to the
recipient
(unlikely scenario)
donor:
offers democracy aid only if the
propensity to provide
democracy aid to the recipient
is high, withholds democracy
aid only if the propensity to
provide democracy aid to the
recipient is low
(likely scenario)
K
ij
≈
0
recipient:
rejects democracy aid
regardless of the propensity to
receive democracy aid from the
offering donor
(unlikely scenario)
recipient:
accepts democracy aid only if
the propensity to receive
democracy aid from the donor
is high, rejects democracy aid
only if the propensity to receive
democracy aid from the donor
is low
(likely scenario)
defier: always-taker:
D
em
Ai
d i
jt
>
10
0,
00
0
U
SD
donor:
withholds democracy aid only if
the propensity to provide
democracy aid to the recipient
is high, offers democracy aid
only if the propensity to
provide democracy aid to the
recipient is low
(unlikely scenario)
donor:
offers democracy aid regardless
of the propensity to provide
democracy aid to the recipient
(unlikely scenario)
recipient:
rejects democracy aid only if
the propensity to receive
democracy aid from the donor
is high, accepts democracy aid
only if the propensity to receive
democracy aid from the donor
is low
(unlikely scenario)
recipient:
accepts democracy aid
regardless of the propensity to
receive democracy aid from the
offering donor
(unlikely scenario)
Kij: propensity of donor j providing aid to recipient i over the whole period under study
DemAidijt: amount of democracy aid that recipient i receives aid from donor j at time t
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monad type in the last column. In case 6, where the instrument suggests giving aid, but
none is given, the outcome is most likely due to a never-taker, as defiance to the instru-
ment is considered unlikely. In cases 3 and 8, the donor offers aid, but the recipient
instrument suggests that the recipient should not take it. As I assume that both always-
takers and defiers are an unlikely scenario for the propensity instrument, I conclude
that these configurations rarely occur in practice. Cases 4 and 9 mirror this setting with
a favorable propensity and a rejection by the recipient, which is why I also consider
them unlikely. Cases 2, 5, 7 and 10 combine donor always-takers with recipient com-
pliers (since never-takers and always-takers are unlikely on the recipient side for the
propensity instrument). I conclude that these cases can be considered compliers on the
monadic level. In sum, this suggests that on the monadic level we only deal with never-
takers and compliers. This would mean that the LATE I am estimating is rather broad,
as almost all cases with many donors would be considered compliers. Such a conclu-
sion would, however, overburden this exercise. One could, for example, imagine that
some recipients that had not received democracy aid previously would happily accept
some due to recent domestic changes. The probability of observing always-takers on
the recipient side would also be much higher in the case of distance as the recipient
instrument, which partly removes the issue of path dependency. But the main goal
pursued here was to argue that the likelihood that compliers exists is very high, and
that the likelihood that defiers exist is very low at the aggregate monadic level of my
instrumental variable. I thus conclude that these are reasonable assumptions.
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Figure B4: Variation in the share of female legislators in donor parliaments, 1994–2013
(levels)
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Figure B5: Variation in the share of female legislators in donor parliaments, 1994–2013
(changes)
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Figure B6: Scatterplot of zero-stage and interaction instruments (WiP:women in donor
parliament; p: propensity to receive democracy aid)
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Table C1: Base models
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Number of democracy donors 1.03∗ 0.84∗
[0.52; 1.54] [0.32; 1.37]
Number of democracy donors (estimated) 2.58∗ 2.72∗
[1.26; 3.91] [1.42; 4.02]
Number of economic donors 0.02
[−0.51; 0.55]
Democracy aid (m USD; log) 0.79 −0.60
[−0.37; 1.95] [−2.13; 0.93]
Economic aid (m USD; log) 3.51∗
[0.79; 6.24]
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Period fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Additional controls no yes no yes
# of observations 715 715 715 715
# of countries 133 133 133 133
R2 0.93 0.93 0.91 0.91
KP F-statistic 32.39 34.68
*) 95% confidence interval clustered at the country level (in brackets) does not include zero;
dependent variable: V-Dem polyarchy democracy index scaled to a range of [0; 100];
additional controls include population (log), GDP per capita (log) and a civil conflict dummy;
all explanatory variables lagged by one period.
Base models
Table C1 provides results for themodels that constitute the starting point for the robust-
ness checks presented in this appendix. They comprise four models testing the main
hypothesis that the number of democracy donors affects democracy in the recipient
country. Model 1 is the OLS specification without controls, model 2 the OLS specifica-
tion with controls (including the number of economic aid donors). These models are
equivalent to models 1 and 4 in panel A in table 1 in the main article. Model 3 is the in-
strumental variable specification without controls, employing the interaction of women
in the donor parliament with the propensity to receive democracy aid as instrument.
Model 4 is the same specification with controls. These models are equivalent to models
1 and 2 in panel B in table 1 in the main article. Figures C1 and C2 present graphi-
cal impressions on the estimated effects of interest for OLS model 2 and IV model 4,
corresponding to figure 3 in the paper.
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Figure C1: Expected levels of democracy conditional on the number of democracy
donors; OLS model 2; covariates set to the levels of Ghana in the 2012 period
0
25
50
75
100
0 10 20 30
Number of democracy donors
(boxplot shows sample distribution)
D
em
oc
ra
cy
 le
ve
l (V
−D
em
 po
lya
rc
hy
,
 
re
sc
a
le
d)
Figure C2: Expected levels of democracy conditional on the number of democracy
donors; IV model 4; covariates set to the levels of Ghana in the 2012 period
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Table C2: Donor proliferation and democracy, full OLS models
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Number of democracy donors 1.03∗ 0.96∗ 0.96∗ 0.84∗
[0.52; 1.54] [0.47; 1.46] [0.47; 1.46] [0.32; 1.37]
Democracy aid (m USD; log) 1.09 1.09 0.79
[−0.15; 2.32] [−0.15; 2.32] [−0.37; 1.95]
Number of economic donors 0.02
[−0.51; 0.55]
Economic aid (m USD; log) 3.51∗
[0.79; 6.24]
Number of donors 0.49
[−0.08; 1.06]
Aid (m USD; log) 5.21∗
[1.89; 8.53]
Pop. (log) x 10 0.54 0.54 −0.11 0.64
[−4.75; 5.82] [−4.75; 5.82] [−5.43; 5.21] [−4.79; 6.07]
GDP p.c. (log) x 10 −0.71 −0.71 −0.71 −0.33
[−2.14; 0.73] [−2.14; 0.73] [−2.15; 0.74] [−1.78; 1.12]
Civil conflict −3.10 −3.10 −2.98 −3.31
[−7.95; 1.75] [−7.95; 1.75] [−7.69; 1.72] [−8.37; 1.76]
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Period fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
# of observations 715 715 715 715 715
# of countries 133 133 133 133 133
R2 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93
*) 95% confidence interval clustered at the country level (in brackets) does not include zero;
dependent variable: V-Dem polyarchy democracy index scaled to a range of [0; 100];
all explanatory variables lagged by one period.
Full regression tables for models from the main text
Tables C2 to C4 provide the full regression tables for all models that are presented in
table 1 in the main text in a compressed form.
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Table C3: Donor proliferation and democracy, IV first stages
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Z (WiP * Pr(dem. aid)) 0.36∗ 0.36∗ 0.32∗ 0.12∗
[0.24; 0.49] [0.24; 0.47] [0.21; 0.44] [0.04; 0.20]
Z (WiP * inv. dist.) x 1/100 0.21∗
[0.12; 0.31]
Z (leg. frac. * Pr(econ. aid)) −0.97 4.07∗
[−2.84; 0.90] [2.57; 5.57]
Z (leg. frac. * Pr(aid)) 3.68∗
[2.24; 5.11]
Democracy aid (m USD; log) 0.99∗ 0.80∗ 0.87∗ 0.17
[0.33; 1.64] [0.18; 1.43] [0.31; 1.44] [−0.09; 0.42]
Economic aid (m USD; log) 1.27∗ 1.52∗
[0.02; 2.52] [0.72; 2.33]
Aid (m USD; log) 2.00∗
[0.94; 3.07]
Pop. (log) x 10 0.33 0.87 0.18 −0.59 −0.44
[−0.88; 1.54] [−0.36; 2.11] [−1.01; 1.37] [−1.58; 0.41] [−1.46; 0.58]
GDP p.c. (log) x 10 0.16 0.25 0.16 0.04 0.11
[−0.30; 0.63] [−0.26; 0.77] [−0.28; 0.60] [−0.27; 0.35] [−0.20; 0.43]
Civil conflict 0.26 −0.35 0.26 0.65 0.60
[−1.18; 1.70] [−1.70; 1.00] [−0.98; 1.51] [−0.15; 1.44] [−0.36; 1.56]
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Period fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
# of observations 715 715 715 715 715 715
# of countries 133 133 133 133 133 133
R2 0.89 0.90 0.90 0.91 0.92 0.92
*) 95% confidence interval clustered at the country level (in brackets) does not include zero;
dependent variable: V-Dem polyarchy democracy index scaled to a range of [0; 100];
all explanatory variables lagged by one period.
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Table C4: Donor proliferation and democracy, IV second stages
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
No. of dem. donors (est.) 2.58∗ 2.72∗ 3.39∗ 1.98∗
[1.26; 3.91] [1.42; 4.02] [1.24; 5.55] [0.31; 3.66]
Democracy aid (m USD; log) −0.60 −1.24 −0.40
[−2.13; 0.93] [−3.53; 1.04] [−2.01; 1.22]
Economic aid (m USD; log) −1.97
[−5.98; 2.03]
No. of econ. donors (est.) 1.50
[−0.43; 3.42]
Aid (m USD; log) 2.36
[−3.44; 8.16]
No. of donors (est.) 1.54
[−0.51; 3.59]
Pop. (log) x 10 −1.32 −2.03 −0.50 1.03
[−6.62; 3.99] [−7.99; 3.94] [−5.75; 4.74] [−4.13; 6.19]
GDP p.c. (log) x 10 −1.50 −1.81 −1.28 −0.38
[−3.25; 0.24] [−3.81; 0.20] [−3.18; 0.63] [−1.84; 1.08]
Civil conflict −2.69 −2.54 −3.54 −3.96
[−7.07; 1.68] [−7.17; 2.10] [−8.06; 0.97] [−8.71; 0.79]
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Period fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
# of observations 715 715 715 715 715
# of countries 133 133 133 133 133
R2 0.91 0.91 0.89 0.91 0.92
KP F-statistic 32.39 34.68 18.02 15.08 25.16
...for the second instrument 21.64
*) 95% confidence interval clustered at the country level (in brackets) does not include zero;
dependent variable: V-Dem polyarchy democracy index scaled to a range of [0; 100];
all explanatory variables lagged by one period.
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Table C5: Base models with OECD disbursement data instead of AidData commitment
data
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Number of democracy donors 0.80∗ 0.81∗
[0.28; 1.32] [0.21; 1.42]
Number of democracy donors (estimated) 1.37∗ 1.47∗
[0.40; 2.34] [0.45; 2.50]
Number of economic donors −0.34
[−0.96; 0.29]
Democracy aid (m USD; log) −0.20 0.01
[−1.68; 1.29] [−1.51; 1.53]
Economic aid (m USD; log) 4.26∗
[0.19; 8.33]
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Period fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Additional controls no yes no yes
# of observations 668 668 668 668
# of countries 121 121 121 121
R2 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.91
KP F-statistic 59.20 70.81
*) 95% confidence interval clustered at the country level (in brackets) does not include zero;
dependent variable: V-Dem polyarchy democracy index scaled to a range of [0; 100];
additional controls include population (log), GDP per capita (log) and a civil conflict dummy;
all explanatory variables lagged by one period.
Alternative indicators
Aid flow types: commitments and disbursements
In the main paper, I employ commitment data from the AidData project due to supe-
rior coverage compared to the OECD’s disbursement data available from the Creditor
Reporting System (CRS). I also argue that commitments are a good proxy for donor’s
intentions and engagement over the three-year time periods used here. Nonetheless,
one would expect the mechanism to be visible with disbursement data from the CRS
as well. Table C5 presents the corresponding results. The disbursement variables are
constructed exactly like the corresponding commitments variables, with the exception
of the data source. The hypothesis is again confirmed by all models, albeit with much
smaller coefficients in the IV specification. When including commitment and disburse-
ment data simultaneously in the OLS models, the number of donors providing democ-
racy aid commitments is significant, the number of those providing democracy aid dis-
bursements is not (table C6, models 1 to 2). This latter finding is difficult to interpret
substantially, but the robustness of the relationship of the number of donors committing
democracy aid with democracy becomes evident.
My universe of donors includes the eight largest multilateral organizations. Restricting
the analysis to only bilateral donors (30 countries) does not affect the results substantially
(table C7).
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Table C6: Base OLS models with both OECD disbursement data and AidData commit-
ment data
Model 1 Model 2
Number of democracy donors, com. 0.91∗ 0.60∗
[0.34; 1.48] [0.08; 1.13]
Number of democracy donors, disb. 0.15 0.34
[−0.41; 0.72] [−0.32; 1.01]
Number of economic donors, com. 0.32
[−0.29; 0.93]
Number of economic donors, disb. −0.41
[−1.09; 0.26]
Democracy aid (m USD; log), com. 1.95∗
[0.04; 3.87]
Democracy aid (m USD; log), disb. −1.47
[−3.18; 0.23]
Economic aid (m USD; log), com. 2.32
[−0.83; 5.47]
Economic aid (m USD; log), disb. 2.14
[−1.72; 6.00]
Country fixed effects yes yes
Period fixed effects yes yes
Additional controls no yes
# of observations 668 668
# of countries 121 121
R2 0.92 0.93
*) 95% confidence interval clustered at the country level (in brackets) does not include zero;
dependent variable: V-Dem polyarchy democracy index scaled to a range of [0; 100];
additional controls include population (log), GDP per capita (log) and a civil conflict dummy;
all explanatory variables lagged by one period.
Table C7: Base models with bilateral donors only
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Number of democracy donors 1.07∗ 0.98∗
[0.51; 1.63] [0.41; 1.56]
Number of democracy donors (estimated) 2.45∗ 2.63∗
[0.94; 3.96] [1.16; 4.09]
Number of economic donors −0.22
[−0.89; 0.44]
Democracy aid (m USD; log) 0.17 −0.63
[−0.76; 1.11] [−2.05; 0.78]
Economic aid (m USD; log) 3.74∗
[0.75; 6.74]
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Period fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Additional controls no yes no yes
# of observations 715 715 715 715
# of countries 133 133 133 133
R2 0.93 0.93 0.92 0.91
KP F-statistic 26.73 28.11
*) 95% confidence interval clustered at the country level (in brackets) does not include zero;
dependent variable: V-Dem polyarchy democracy index scaled to a range of [0; 100];
additional controls include population (log), GDP per capita (log) and a civil conflict dummy;
all explanatory variables lagged by one period.
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Table C8: OLS estimates with alternative and ’placebo’ sectors
Democracy Democracy, no PB Civil society Economic Health Energy
No. of donors 0.96∗ 0.91∗ 0.83∗ 0.38 0.59∗ −0.32
[0.47; 1.46] [0.43; 1.40] [0.37; 1.30] [−0.15; 0.92] [0.09; 1.08] [−0.81; 0.17]
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Period fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Additional controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
# of observations 715 715 715 715 715 715
# of countries 133 133 133 133 133 133
R2 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.92 0.92
*) 95% confidence interval clustered at the country level (in brackets) does not include zero;
dependent variable: V-Dem polyarchy democracy index scaled to a range of [0; 100];
additional controls include population (log), GDP per capita (log) and a civil conflict dummy;
all explanatory variables lagged by one period.
Aid sectors: alternatives and ‘placebos’
Table C8 repeats the analysis of table 2 from the paper for the OLS specification with
control variables. Here, health aid unexpectedly reaches a positive and significant re-
lationship, but all other substantive interpretations remain the same: governance aid
proliferation is related to improved democracy in the recipient country; other aid sector
proliferation is not.
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Table C9: Aid controls per GDP and per capita
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
No. of dem. donors 0.86∗ 0.68∗
[0.30; 1.41] [0.14; 1.21]
No. of dem. donors (est.) 2.69∗ 2.86∗
[1.16; 4.22] [1.28; 4.44]
No. of econ. donors 0.03 0.01
[−0.40; 0.46] [−0.48; 0.50]
Dem. aid (percent of GDP; log) 79.51 9.39
[−20.66; 179.68] [−123.33; 142.12]
Econ. aid (percent of GDP; log) 15.29
[−5.10; 35.68]
Dem. aid (per capita; log) 4.15∗ −2.12
[1.67; 6.62] [−7.11; 2.86]
Econ. aid (per capita; log) 3.26∗
[0.65; 5.86]
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Period fixed effects yes yes yes yes
# of observations 715 715 715 715
# of countries 133 133 133 133
R2 0.93 0.93 0.91 0.91
KP F-statistic 22.61 28.39
*) 95% confidence interval clustered at the country level (in brackets) does not include zero;
dependent variable: V-Dem polyarchy democracy index scaled to a range of [0; 100];
all explanatory variables lagged by one period.
Aid amount references: per GDP and per capita
The choice of including absolute aid amounts as a control for aid flows in my main
specification could be questioned. Table C9 gives results when controlling for aid as a
share of GDP and aid per capita instead (in base models 2 and 4, respectively; see table
C1). The confidence intervals of all estimates of the effects of the number of democracy
donors exclude zero. The estimated coefficients are of almost the same sizes as in the
base specifications.
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Table C10: Base models with fragmentation measured by the number of small donors
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Number of small dem. donors 0.78∗ 0.59∗
[0.31; 1.25] [0.18; 1.01]
Number of small dem. donors (estimated) 2.80∗ 2.87∗
[1.29; 4.31] [1.44; 4.30]
Number of small econ. donors 0.18
[−0.29; 0.64]
Democracy aid (m USD; log) 0.87 −1.04
[−0.34; 2.08] [−3.09; 1.01]
Economic aid (m USD; log) 3.83∗
[0.83; 6.82]
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Period fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Additional controls no yes no yes
# of observations 715 715 715 715
# of countries 133 133 133 133
R2 0.93 0.93 0.89 0.89
KP F-statistic 28.75 30.91
*) 95% confidence interval clustered at the country level (in brackets) does not include zero;
dependent variable: V-Dem polyarchy democracy index scaled to a range of [0; 100];
additional controls include population (log), GDP per capita (log) and a civil conflict dummy;
all explanatory variables lagged by one period.
Aid fragmentation indicators
As I argue in the article, certain indicators of fragmentation are more suited to express
the theoretical constructs that underlie my argument than others. My preferred indica-
tor to measure the diversity of ideas and positions provided by donors is the number of
democracy donors. Nonetheless, I here show results for specifications employing three
alternative fragmentation measures as suggested by Gehring et al. (2017): the number
of small donors only (i.e., donors that provide less than 10 percent of the overall aid
flows to a recipient), the inverted Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration index (HHI) as
a measure of financial fragmentation, and the share of aid covered by the three biggest
donors. Table C10 presents the results of the base models with the number of small
donors replacing my original fragmentation variables. Direction and significance of the
coefficients remain essentially unchanged.
The inverted HHI is calculated as one minus the sum of squares of the aid shares s of all
donors j that report aid commitments in the respective recipient country i and sector r
in period t (Hirschman 1964):
fragmentationirt = 1−
N∑
j=1
s2jirt.
Table C11 replaces the number of democracy donors with the democracy aid fragmen-
tation index. None of the models produces significant estimates for our variable of
interest, the coefficients carry the wrong signs, and the IV models break down with KP
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Table C11: Basemodels with fragmentationmeasured by theHHI fragmentation index
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Dem. donor fragm. index −3.37 −2.98
[−9.15; 2.41] [−8.11; 2.14]
Dem. donor fragm. index (estimated) x 100 −3.63 −2.92
[−13.19; 5.92] [−9.39; 3.54]
Econ. donor fragm. index 0.36
[−0.15; 0.88]
Democracy aid (m USD; log) 1.26 −7.24
[−0.19; 2.71] [−32.17; 17.70]
Economic aid (m USD; log) 4.17∗
[1.32; 7.01]
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Period fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Additional controls no yes no yes
# of observations 715 715 715 715
# of countries 133 133 133 133
R2 0.92 0.93 -3.58 -1.94
KP F-statistic 0.57 0.80
*) 95% confidence interval clustered at the country level (in brackets) does not include zero;
dependent variable: V-Dem polyarchy democracy index scaled to a range of [0; 100];
additional controls include population (log), GDP per capita (log) and a civil conflict dummy;
all explanatory variables lagged by one period.
F-statistics very low. I do not consider this corrosive to my argument, as the number
of donors has a much more straightforward link to the concept of diversity; my theory
explicitly rejects the notion that higher amounts transmit more ideas, and the thresh-
old of 100,000 USD per year for donors to be counted ensures that only donors with
a notable presence are considered. Tables C37 and C36 further below investigate the
interaction between the number of donors and the amount of aid more explicitly.
Table C12 gives the results for the concentration ratio. Donor proliferation coefficients
in all models display negative coefficients, which is in line withmy expectations, as larger
concentration should result in less diversity and thus less positive effects on democracy.
The confidence intervals exclude zero in all cases, except for the bivariate OLS regres-
sion (model 1). The KP F-statistics of the IV models, however, are very low. Nonethe-
less, these results increase my confidence in the main results. While I consider the
number of donors to be the best representation of diversity on the donor side, two out
of three alternative fragmentation indicators produce similar results.
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Table C12: Base models with fragmentation measured by the concentration ratio
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Dem. donor conc. rate −1.29 −8.55∗
[−5.89; 3.31] [−16.72; −0.39]
Dem. donor conc. rate (estimated) x 100 −1.47∗ −1.83∗
[−2.90; −0.03] [−3.64; −0.01]
Econ. donor conc. rate 0.27
[−0.23; 0.76]
Democracy aid (m USD; log) 2.45∗ 23.91∗
[0.57; 4.34] [2.09; 45.72]
Economic aid (m USD; log) 3.93∗
[0.98; 6.88]
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Period fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Additional controls no yes no yes
# of observations 715 715 715 715
# of countries 133 133 133 133
R2 0.92 0.93 0.51 0.58
KP F-statistic 5.36 4.23
*) 95% confidence interval clustered at the country level (in brackets) does not include zero;
dependent variable: V-Dem polyarchy democracy index scaled to a range of [0; 100];
additional controls include population (log), GDP per capita (log) and a civil conflict dummy;
all explanatory variables lagged by one period.
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Table C13: Base models with the Polity IV polity2 index as dependent variable
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Number of democracy donors 0.97∗ 0.92∗
[0.33; 1.60] [0.34; 1.50]
Number of democracy donors (estimated) 2.76∗ 2.84∗
[0.80; 4.71] [0.94; 4.74]
Number of economic donors −0.22
[−0.85; 0.40]
Democracy aid (m USD; log) −0.01 −1.38
[−2.65; 2.62] [−4.52; 1.76]
Economic aid (m USD; log) 3.81
[−1.47; 9.09]
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Period fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Additional controls no yes no yes
# of observations 701 701 701 701
# of countries 131 131 131 131
R2 0.91 0.91 0.89 0.90
KP F-statistic 25.22 29.49
*) 95% confidence interval clustered at the country level (in brackets) does not include zero;
dependent variable: Polity IV democracy index scaled to a range of [0; 100];
additional controls include population (log), GDP per capita (log) and a civil conflict dummy;
all explanatory variables lagged by one period.
Democracy indicators
My choice of V-Dem polyarchy as the main dependent variable is somewhat uncom-
mon in empirical democracy research, since V-Dem was released only recently. Tables
C13 to C16 present the base models with alternative dependent variables. Table C13
shows the results for the most common indicator, the polity2 variable provided by the
Polity IV project (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2016). Results remain almost exactly
the same as in the base specifications, although I lose 14 observations compared to sam-
ple using the V-Dem indicator. Table C13 shows results for the interpolated Polity IV
index as suggested by Plümper and Neumayer (2010). Again, results do not change
substantially. Table C15 shows results for the aggregate Freedom House index (Free-
dom House 2017). Again, coefficients and confidence intervals remain almost identical
to the base models. Only the Unified Democracy Scale (UDS; Pemstein, Meserve, and
Melton 2010), a meta index consisting of ten democracy indices published by different
sources, generates smaller estimates that are nonetheless statistically significant. One
explanation for the smaller size of the estimates could be the smaller variance found in
the UDS: on the normalized scale of 0 to 100, the standard deviation reaches only 17,
compared to 25 to 31 in the other democracy indices. Note, however, that all alterna-
tive democracy indicators produce consistently significant results in line with the main
specifications.
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Table C14: Base models with the interpolated Polity IV index as dependent variable
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Number of democracy donors 0.84∗ 0.79∗
[0.21; 1.47] [0.23; 1.35]
Number of democracy donors (estimated) 2.64∗ 2.68∗
[0.68; 4.60] [0.75; 4.61]
Number of economic donors −0.14
[−0.77; 0.49]
Democracy aid (m USD; log) −0.17 −1.52
[−2.74; 2.40] [−4.64; 1.60]
Economic aid (m USD; log) 3.35
[−2.07; 8.77]
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Period fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Additional controls no yes no yes
# of observations 701 701 701 701
# of countries 131 131 131 131
R2 0.91 0.91 0.90 0.90
KP F-statistic 25.22 29.49
*) 95% confidence interval clustered at the country level (in brackets) does not include zero;
dependent variable: Polity IV interpolated democracy index scaled to a range of [0; 100];
additional controls include population (log), GDP per capita (log) and a civil conflict dummy;
all explanatory variables lagged by one period.
Table C15: Base models with the Freedom House index as dependent variable
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Number of democracy donors 0.83∗ 0.63∗
[0.39; 1.26] [0.14; 1.11]
Number of democracy donors (estimated) 2.64∗ 2.61∗
[1.15; 4.13] [1.06; 4.16]
Number of economic donors −0.05
[−0.52; 0.41]
Democracy aid (m USD; log) 1.07∗ −0.47
[0.24; 1.90] [−2.20; 1.27]
Economic aid (m USD; log) 3.43∗
[0.54; 6.32]
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Period fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Additional controls no yes no yes
# of observations 715 715 715 715
# of countries 133 133 133 133
R2 0.93 0.93 0.91 0.91
KP F-statistic 32.39 34.68
*) 95% confidence interval clustered at the country level (in brackets) does not include zero;
dependent variable: Freedom House democracy index scaled to a range of [0; 100];
additional controls include population (log), GDP per capita (log) and a civil conflict dummy;
all explanatory variables lagged by one period.
C-16
Table C16: Basemodels with theUnifiedDemocracy Scale (UDS) as dependent variable
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Number of democracy donors 0.43∗ 0.34∗
[0.13; 0.73] [0.05; 0.64]
Number of democracy donors (estimated) 1.18∗ 1.22∗
[0.38; 1.97] [0.36; 2.09]
Number of economic donors −0.10
[−0.37; 0.17]
Democracy aid (m USD; log) 0.36 −0.22
[−0.72; 1.45] [−1.49; 1.04]
Economic aid (m USD; log) 2.71∗
[0.46; 4.96]
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Period fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Additional controls no yes no yes
# of observations 715 715 715 715
# of countries 133 133 133 133
R2 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.93
KP F-statistic 32.39 34.68
*) 95% confidence interval clustered at the country level (in brackets) does not include zero;
dependent variable: UDS democracy index scaled to a range of [0; 100];
additional controls include population (log), GDP per capita (log) and a civil conflict dummy;
all explanatory variables lagged by one period.
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Table C17: OLS estimates with V-Dem component indices as dependent variables
Liberal Participatory Deliberative Egalitarian
No. of dem. donors 0.74∗ 0.62∗ 0.88∗ 0.28∗
[0.30; 1.18] [0.27; 0.97] [0.34; 1.43] [0.07; 0.49]
No. of econ. donors −0.05 −0.11 −0.01 −0.03
[−0.56; 0.46] [−0.37; 0.16] [−0.65; 0.63] [−0.31; 0.25]
Dem. aid (m USD; log) 0.52 0.26 0.33 0.11
[−0.40; 1.44] [−0.44; 0.96] [−1.32; 1.97] [−0.32; 0.54]
Econ. aid (m USD; log) 2.36 2.95 4.23 0.36
[−0.74; 5.45] [−0.19; 6.10] [−0.50; 8.96] [−0.96; 1.68]
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Period fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Additional controls yes yes yes yes
# of observations 715 715 715 715
# of countries 133 133 133 133
R2 0.95 0.95 0.90 0.98
*) 95% confidence interval clustered at the country level (in brackets) does not include zero;
dependent variable: V-Dem polyarchy democracy index scaled to a range of [0; 100];
additional controls include population (log), GDP per capita (log) and a civil conflict dummy;
all explanatory variables lagged by one period.
Sub-components of democracy
A look at sub-components of democracy may shed additional light on whether the sug-
gested causal mechanism is plausible (cp. Lührmann, McMann, and Van Ham 2017).
Table C17 provides results of OLS model 2 for sub-components of democracy as mea-
sured by the V-Dem project (Coppedge, Gerring, Lindberg, Skaaning, and Teorell
2017). Table C18 conducts the same exercise for IV model 3 without control variables.
(Including controls does not change the results substantively.) It shows that both the
‘liberal principle’ index, whichmeasures individual rights as well as checks and balances,
and the ‘participatory principle’ index, which measures the degree of participation and
direct democracy, produce estimates with confidence intervals that exclude zero in both
OLS and IV specifications. The ‘deliberative principle’ index, which measures the ra-
tionality and civility of political debate, and the ‘egalitarian principle’ index, which mea-
sures the ability of individuals to become politically active, only reach significant levels
in the OLS specification. These findings resonate well with my main argument: diver-
sity on the donor side is likely to improve democratic practice (liberal principle) and
organized participation (participatory principle). It is less likely to change norms and
practices in the short run (deliberative principle) or reduce political inequality of indi-
viduals (egalitarian principle).
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Table C18: IV estimates with V-Dem component indices as dependent variables
Liberal Participatory Deliberative Egalitarian
No. of dem. donors (est.) 1.90∗ 1.81∗ 1.28 0.26
[0.61; 3.20] [0.85; 2.77] [−0.15; 2.71] [−0.40; 0.93]
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Period fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Additional controls no no no no
# of observations 715 715 715 715
# of countries 133 133 133 133
R2 0.94 0.94 0.90 0.98
KP F-statistic 32.39 32.39 32.39 32.39
*) 95% confidence interval clustered at the country level (in brackets) does not include zero;
dependent variable: V-Dem polyarchy democracy index scaled to a range of [0; 100];
additional controls include population (log), GDP per capita (log) and a civil conflict dummy;
all explanatory variables lagged by one period.
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Indicators of democratic diversity
The causal mechanism suggests that donor diversity improves democracy in the recip-
ient country by fostering local diversity. Tables C19 and C20 provide OLS and IV
results for specifications that model this relationship more closely: the rather general
dependent variable ‘democracy’ is here substituted by indicators of democratic diversity
provided by the V-Dem project (Coppedge, Gerring, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, et
al. 2017). The first indicator considered here is the share of seats won by the largest
party (v2ellostlg in the V-Dem database). One might expect that political diversity in-
creases the chances of parties other than the largest (and presumably ruling) party in
elections . In both the OLS and the IV specification, the coefficient for the share of the
largest party is negative, as expected, but it does not reach significance (model 1). Note
that the sample size decreases by almost 50 percent for this indicator, as data is only
recorded for countries with partisan elections. The number of effective and distinctive
party platforms (v2psplats), however, does increase significantly in both specifications
(model 2). Respect for counterarguments (v2dlcountr) also increases when more donors
are present, although not significantly when using the IV specification (model 3). The
same holds for ‘engaged society’ (v2dlengage), an indicator on how ‘wide and how in-
dependent’ public deliberations are (model 4). The ‘the involvement of people in civil
society organizations’ that measures both the diversity and the activity of civil society
(v2csprtcpt), however, is again significant in both specifications (model 5). These results
supports the notion that donor proliferation actually improves democracy by increas-
ing the diversity of political organizations the recipient country, both in the realm of
political parties and in the realm of civil society organizations. Electoral results and
deliberative practice do not appear to be robustly affected.
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Table C19: OLS estimates with V-Dem indicators of democratic diversity
Largest party share Party platforms Counterarguments Engaged society CSO environment
No. of dem. donors −0.02 0.03∗ 0.03∗ 0.03∗ 0.03∗
[−0.98; 0.94] [0.01; 0.04] [0.01; 0.06] [0.01; 0.06] [0.01; 0.06]
No. of econ. donors −0.74 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
[−2.09; 0.61] [−0.01; 0.01] [−0.03; 0.04] [−0.02; 0.03] [−0.01; 0.03]
Dem. aid (m USD; log) −1.55 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.01
[−5.10; 2.01] [−0.01; 0.08] [−0.03; 0.12] [−0.06; 0.09] [−0.05; 0.07]
Econ. aid (m USD; log) −2.29 0.08 0.21 0.21 0.19
[−9.73; 5.14] [−0.02; 0.17] [−0.05; 0.47] [−0.06; 0.49] [−0.02; 0.41]
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Period fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Additional controls yes yes yes yes yes
# of observations 396 715 715 715 715
# of countries 123 133 133 133 133
R2 0.75 0.96 0.88 0.90 0.91
*) 95% confidence interval clustered at the country level (in brackets) does not include zero;
dependent variable: V-Dem polyarchy democracy index scaled to a range of [0; 100];
additional controls include population (log), GDP per capita (log) and a civil conflict dummy;
all explanatory variables lagged by one period.
Table C20: IV estimates with V-Dem indicators of democratic diversity
Largest party share Party platforms Counterarguments Engaged society CSO environment
No. of dem. donors (est.) −2.43 0.05∗ 0.07 0.04 0.08∗
[−5.19; 0.34] [0.01; 0.09] [−0.00; 0.14] [−0.02; 0.10] [0.03; 0.14]
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Period fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Additional controls no no no no no
# of observations 396 715 715 715 715
# of countries 123 133 133 133 133
R2 0.71 0.96 0.87 0.90 0.90
KP F-statistic 28.81 32.39 32.39 32.39 32.39
*) 95% confidence interval clustered at the country level (in brackets) does not include zero;
dependent variable: V-Dem polyarchy democracy index scaled to a range of [0; 100];
additional controls include population (log), GDP per capita (log) and a civil conflict dummy;
all explanatory variables lagged by one period.
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Table C21: Base models with additional control variables
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
No. of dem. donors 0.82∗ 0.97∗
[0.30; 1.33] [0.37; 1.57]
No. of dem. donors (est.) 2.50∗ 3.11∗
[1.14; 3.86] [1.45; 4.76]
No. of econ. donors −0.01 −0.16
[−0.47; 0.45] [−0.69; 0.37]
Dem. aid (m USD; log) 0.70 0.61 −0.53 −0.81
[−0.37; 1.78] [−0.18; 1.41] [−2.09; 1.03] [−2.68; 1.06]
Econ. aid (m USD; log) 3.19∗ 2.52
[0.35; 6.04] [−0.33; 5.37]
Pop. (log) x 10 −0.09 −0.25 −1.30 −0.89
[−6.01; 5.83] [−7.02; 6.53] [−7.17; 4.58] [−7.80; 6.02]
GDP p.c. (log) x 10 −0.85 0.27 −1.63 −0.62
[−2.52; 0.83] [−1.69; 2.22] [−3.52; 0.25] [−3.12; 1.89]
Civil conflict −3.61 −2.88 −3.34 −3.54
[−8.66; 1.44] [−9.58; 3.82] [−8.01; 1.34] [−9.43; 2.35]
Trade (percent of GDP) x 1/10 0.43 0.49 0.25 0.33
[−0.08; 0.94] [−0.46; 1.43] [−0.36; 0.86] [−0.73; 1.40]
GDP growth (percent) −0.22 −0.33 −0.23 −0.43∗
[−0.46; 0.03] [−0.66; 0.00] [−0.53; 0.07] [−0.76; −0.09]
EU accession prospect 4.19 3.39 2.40 1.05
[−2.67; 11.05] [−3.98; 10.76] [−5.87; 10.67] [−8.15; 10.25]
Fuel exports (percent of exports) −0.13∗ −0.20∗
[−0.23; −0.03] [−0.36; −0.03]
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Period fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Additional controls yes yes yes yes
# of observations 701 580 701 580
# of countries 132 121 132 121
R2 0.93 0.93 0.92 0.91
KP F-statistic 29.56 16.79
*) 95% confidence interval clustered at the country level (in brackets) does not include zero;
dependent variable: V-Dem polyarchy democracy index scaled to a range of [0; 100];
all explanatory variables lagged by one period.
Additional controls
Table C21 shows that the main effects are immune to adding more control variables
commonly found in studies of democratization. In models 1 and 3, I add trade as a
share of GDP, GDP growth and prospects for EU accession to the OLS and the IV base
models with controls, respectively. Note that including these control variables leads to
a loss of 14 observations compared to the base models. In models 2 and 4, I add fuel
exports as a share of merchandise exports, which reduces the sample by more than 100
observations. Fuel exports is the only additional variable that is consistently significantly
related to the outcome democracy (with the expected negative sign). All data for the
additional variables comes from The World Bank (2016), except EU accession status,
which I obtained from the European Central Bank.
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Table C22: Base models, one-year time windows
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
No. of dem. donors 1.02∗ 0.83∗
[0.63; 1.40] [0.41; 1.24]
No. of dem. donors (est.) 2.25∗ 2.51∗
[1.39; 3.12] [1.45; 3.58]
No. of econ. donors −0.06
[−0.33; 0.22]
Dem. aid (m USD; log) 0.35 −0.34
[−0.05; 0.74] [−1.06; 0.39]
Econ. aid (m USD; log) 3.44∗
[1.53; 5.34]
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Period fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Additional controls no yes no yes
# of observations 2344 2255 2344 2255
# of countries 134 132 134 132
R2 0.91 0.91 0.90 0.89
KP F-statistic 51.95 54.41
*) 95% confidence interval clustered at the country level (in brackets) does not include zero;
dependent variable: V-Dem polyarchy democracy index scaled to a range of [0; 100];
additional controls include population (log), GDP per capita (log) and a civil conflict dummy;
all explanatory variables lagged by one period.
Alternative samples
Alternative time windows
Tables C22 to C24 give results with one-year, two-year and four-year time windows. All
estimates of the effects of the number of democracy donors on democracy are significant,
except the four-year OLS specification with controls (table C24, model 2). One possible
interpretation of this result is that effects created by donor proliferation dissipate over
time. Carnegie and Marinov (2017) find similarly short-term results on human rights
and democracy for aid given by the European Union. All in all, the overwhelming
robustness over a large range of different temporal aggregation levels is comforting.
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Table C23: Base models, two-year time windows
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
No. of dem. donors 0.96∗ 0.80∗
[0.54; 1.38] [0.36; 1.23]
No. of dem. donors (est.) 2.23∗ 2.38∗
[1.30; 3.15] [1.30; 3.46]
No. of econ. donors −0.06
[−0.45; 0.32]
Dem. aid (m USD; log) 0.25 −0.59
[−0.36; 0.86] [−1.56; 0.37]
Econ. aid (m USD; log) 3.54∗
[1.16; 5.92]
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Period fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Additional controls no yes no yes
# of observations 1115 1076 1115 1076
# of countries 134 132 134 132
R2 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.91
KP F-statistic 42.76 41.88
*) 95% confidence interval clustered at the country level (in brackets) does not include zero;
dependent variable: V-Dem polyarchy democracy index scaled to a range of [0; 100];
additional controls include population (log), GDP per capita (log) and a civil conflict dummy;
all explanatory variables lagged by one period.
Table C24: Base models, four-year time windows
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
No. of dem. donors 0.55∗ 0.27
[0.01; 1.10] [−0.28; 0.82]
No. of dem. donors (est.) 2.24∗ 2.31∗
[1.06; 3.42] [1.01; 3.62]
No. of econ. donors 0.21
[−0.42; 0.84]
Dem. aid (m USD; log) 0.66 −0.09
[−0.87; 2.19] [−1.70; 1.52]
Econ. aid (m USD; log) 3.91∗
[0.15; 7.66]
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Period fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Additional controls no yes no yes
# of observations 498 482 498 482
# of countries 138 136 138 136
R2 0.94 0.94 0.92 0.92
KP F-statistic 25.08 24.99
*) 95% confidence interval clustered at the country level (in brackets) does not include zero;
dependent variable: V-Dem polyarchy democracy index scaled to a range of [0; 100];
additional controls include population (log), GDP per capita (log) and a civil conflict dummy;
all explanatory variables lagged by one period.
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Table C25: Sub-sample: time period 1994 to 2003
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
No. of dem. donors 0.70∗ 0.66
[0.00; 1.40] [−0.14; 1.46]
No. of dem. donors (est.) 1.62 1.69
[−0.15; 3.39] [−0.00; 3.37]
No. of econ. donors −0.01
[−0.50; 0.48]
Dem. aid (m USD; log) 0.13 −0.14
[−0.42; 0.69] [−1.02; 0.74]
Econ. aid (m USD; log) 0.33
[−1.91; 2.57]
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Period fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Additional controls no yes no yes
# of observations 396 381 396 381
# of countries 134 131 134 131
R2 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97
KP F-statistic 10.24 16.82
*) 95% confidence interval clustered at the country level (in brackets) does not include zero;
dependent variable: V-Dem polyarchy democracy index scaled to a range of [0; 100];
additional controls include population (log), GDP per capita (log) and a civil conflict dummy;
all explanatory variables lagged by one period.
Temporal sub-samples
Are the observed effects robust to alternative temporal samples? Considering only the
period 1994 to 2003, the my main results are not statistically significant at the 95-
percent level. Note, however, that the number of observations per country drops to
only three. The same applies to results based on data from the period 2004 to 2013
(table C26). Extending the length of the period to 15 years (and thus five three-year
periods), however, restores the statistical significance of the results (although the OLS
specification with controls just barely includes zero; table C26). I blame the lack of find-
ings for the 1994 to 2003 and the 2004 to 2013 periods to a lack of temporal variation
and do not consider it detrimental to my overall conclusions.
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Table C26: Sub-sample: time period 2004 to 2013
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
No. of dem. donors 0.99 0.92
[−0.05; 2.04] [−0.17; 2.02]
No. of dem. donors (est.) −2.88 −15.66
[−13.70; 7.95] [−146.16; 114.85]
No. of econ. donors −0.32
[−0.81; 0.17]
Dem. aid (m USD; log) 1.99 47.20
[−1.96; 5.94] [−316.58; 410.97]
Econ. aid (m USD; log) 2.24
[−1.52; 5.99]
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Period fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Additional controls no yes no yes
# of observations 350 340 350 340
# of countries 120 117 120 117
R2 0.96 0.96 0.90 0.01
KP F-statistic 0.56 0.07
*) 95% confidence interval clustered at the country level (in brackets) does not include zero;
dependent variable: V-Dem polyarchy democracy index scaled to a range of [0; 100];
additional controls include population (log), GDP per capita (log) and a civil conflict dummy;
all explanatory variables lagged by one period.
Table C27: Sub-sample: time period 1999 to 2013
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
No. of dem. donors 0.71∗ 0.44
[0.22; 1.21] [−0.04; 0.93]
No. of dem. donors (est.) 3.19∗ 4.08∗
[0.63; 5.74] [0.46; 7.69]
No. of econ. donors 0.27
[−0.12; 0.66]
Dem. aid (m USD; log) 0.97 −5.79
[−2.31; 4.26] [−13.46; 1.88]
Econ. aid (m USD; log) 4.97∗
[2.13; 7.82]
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Period fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Additional controls no yes no yes
# of observations 489 476 489 476
# of countries 138 136 138 136
R2 0.95 0.95 0.92 0.90
KP F-statistic 8.47 5.57
*) 95% confidence interval clustered at the country level (in brackets) does not include zero;
dependent variable: V-Dem polyarchy democracy index scaled to a range of [0; 100];
additional controls include population (log), GDP per capita (log) and a civil conflict dummy;
all explanatory variables lagged by one period.
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Table C28: Sub-sample: only sub-Saharan African countries
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
No. of dem. donors 0.89∗ 0.54
[0.18; 1.60] [−0.25; 1.34]
No. of dem. donors (est.) 2.34∗ 3.67∗
[0.64; 4.04] [0.61; 6.74]
No. of econ. donors 0.78∗
[0.00; 1.56]
Dem. aid (m USD; log) 1.61 −7.36
[−1.74; 4.96] [−15.78; 1.05]
Econ. aid (m USD; log) −0.15
[−3.54; 3.24]
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Period fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Additional controls no yes no yes
# of observations 245 245 245 245
# of countries 41 41 41 41
R2 0.93 0.94 0.91 0.87
KP F-statistic 8.86 7.38
*) 95% confidence interval clustered at the country level (in brackets) does not include zero;
dependent variable: V-Dem polyarchy democracy index scaled to a range of [0; 100];
additional controls include population (log), GDP per capita (log) and a civil conflict dummy;
all explanatory variables lagged by one period.
Geographic sub-samples
Table C28 gives the results for sub-Saharan Africa. The OLS model with controls does
not produce significant effects for democracy donor proliferation at the 95-percent level.
The remainings results are in line with the base specification (and substantially larger
for IV model 4 with control variables). Table C29 gives the results for all recipient
countries outside sub-Saharan Africa. All results are statistically significant and very
close to the base models.
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Table C29: Sub-sample: all countries outside sub-Saharan Africa
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
No. of dem. donors 1.26∗ 1.24∗
[0.56; 1.95] [0.54; 1.93]
No. of dem. donors (est.) 2.65∗ 2.73∗
[1.00; 4.31] [1.17; 4.29]
No. of econ. donors −0.40
[−0.93; 0.13]
Dem. aid (m USD; log) 0.84 0.30
[−0.28; 1.95] [−1.06; 1.67]
Econ. aid (m USD; log) 3.67∗
[0.28; 7.06]
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Period fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Additional controls no yes no yes
# of observations 470 470 470 470
# of countries 92 92 92 92
R2 0.93 0.93 0.92 0.92
KP F-statistic 41.61 39.06
*) 95% confidence interval clustered at the country level (in brackets) does not include zero;
dependent variable: V-Dem polyarchy democracy index scaled to a range of [0; 100];
additional controls include population (log), GDP per capita (log) and a civil conflict dummy;
all explanatory variables lagged by one period.
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Table C30: Sub-sample: countries with a democracy score above the global median
(democracies)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
No. of dem. donors −0.05 −0.08
[−0.47; 0.37] [−0.45; 0.29]
No. of dem. donors (est.) 3.04 3.18
[−1.10; 7.17] [−0.75; 7.11]
No. of econ. donors 0.19
[−0.19; 0.56]
Dem. aid (m USD; log) 0.29 −2.05
[−0.64; 1.21] [−6.01; 1.91]
Econ. aid (m USD; log) 2.57
[−0.30; 5.44]
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Period fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Additional controls no yes no yes
# of observations 357 357 357 357
# of countries 88 88 88 88
R2 0.93 0.93 0.80 0.80
KP F-statistic 4.64 6.33
*) 95% confidence interval clustered at the country level (in brackets) does not include zero;
dependent variable: V-Dem polyarchy democracy index scaled to a range of [0; 100];
additional controls include population (log), GDP per capita (log) and a civil conflict dummy;
all explanatory variables lagged by one period.
Regime type sub-samples
Table C30 shows results for the sample of countries with a democracy score above the
global median (measured by the V-Dem polyarchy index). None of the main effects
maintains significance. For countries below the global median in democracy scores, ef-
fects disappear as well (table C31). A sub-sample of countries between the 25th and
75th percentiles restores significance for both IV models (table C32). I interprete these
results as an indication that my results are driven mostly by countries in the middle
ranges of the democracy indicator. Here, sufficient non-state actors are present to ben-
efit from diverse external support, and additional improvements are easier to obtain
than in more consolidated democracies. The lack of statistical power due to reduced
sample sizes makes it also more difficult to identify effects within these subsamples.
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Table C31: Sub-sample: countries with a democracy score below the global median
(autocracies)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
No. of dem. donors 0.24 0.09
[−0.13; 0.61] [−0.23; 0.41]
No. of dem. donors (est.) 1.07 0.99
[−0.42; 2.55] [−0.19; 2.17]
No. of econ. donors 0.23
[−0.12; 0.58]
Dem. aid (m USD; log) 0.04 −0.24
[−0.85; 0.92] [−1.30; 0.82]
Econ. aid (m USD; log) 1.50
[−0.29; 3.28]
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Period fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Additional controls no yes no yes
# of observations 357 357 357 357
# of countries 82 82 82 82
R2 0.89 0.91 0.88 0.89
KP F-statistic 10.79 10.15
*) 95% confidence interval clustered at the country level (in brackets) does not include zero;
dependent variable: V-Dem polyarchy democracy index scaled to a range of [0; 100];
additional controls include population (log), GDP per capita (log) and a civil conflict dummy;
all explanatory variables lagged by one period.
Table C32: Sub-sample: countries with a democracy score within the middle quartiles
(anocracies)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
No. of dem. donors 0.66∗ 0.54
[0.03; 1.29] [−0.02; 1.10]
No. of dem. donors (est.) 1.80∗ 2.31∗
[0.28; 3.32] [0.85; 3.77]
No. of econ. donors −0.14
[−0.68; 0.40]
Dem. aid (m USD; log) 1.34 −0.04
[−0.29; 2.97] [−2.08; 1.99]
Econ. aid (m USD; log) 5.53∗
[1.99; 9.07]
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Period fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Additional controls no yes no yes
# of observations 378 374 378 374
# of countries 86 84 86 84
R2 0.81 0.82 0.78 0.76
KP F-statistic 26.61 20.20
*) 95% confidence interval clustered at the country level (in brackets) does not include zero;
dependent variable: V-Dem polyarchy democracy index scaled to a range of [0; 100];
additional controls include population (log), GDP per capita (log) and a civil conflict dummy;
all explanatory variables lagged by one period.
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Table C33: Lagged dependent variable (LDV) model
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Democracy 0.95∗ 0.93∗ 0.95∗ 0.94∗
[0.93; 0.97] [0.90; 0.96] [0.92; 0.97] [0.91; 0.96]
No. of dem. donors 0.09 0.10
[−0.00; 0.18] [−0.09; 0.29]
No. of dem. donors (est.) 0.18∗ 0.30∗
[0.07; 0.28] [0.12; 0.48]
No. of econ. donors 0.08
[−0.13; 0.29]
Dem. aid (m USD; log) −0.09 −0.43
[−0.78; 0.61] [−1.25; 0.39]
Econ. aid (m USD; log) 0.42
[−1.28; 2.12]
(Intercept) 2.72∗ −4.33 1.80∗ 0.84
[1.34; 4.10] [−18.33; 9.67] [0.26; 3.33] [−6.87; 8.56]
Country fixed effects no no no no
Period fixed effects no no no no
Additional controls no yes no yes
# of observations 715 715 715 715
# of countries 133 133 133 133
R2 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92
KP F-statistic 337.29 243.82
*) 95% confidence interval clustered at the country level (in brackets) does not include zero;
dependent variable: V-Dem polyarchy democracy index scaled to a range of [0; 100];
additional controls include population (log), GDP per capita (log) and a civil conflict dummy;
all explanatory variables lagged by one period.
Alternative models
Lagged dependent variable (LDV) models
The fixed effects specification employed in the base models will overestimate the true
effect if a lagged dependent variable (LDV) specification is closer to the true model
(Angrist and Pischke 2009: 243–246). The LDV estimates in tables C33 and C34 can
thus be interpreted as lower bounds for the effect sizes. With three-year time windows,
IV estimates are significant, OLS estimates are not (table C33, models 1 and 2). Sign-
ficance of the latter is restored with yearly data, however (table C34, model 2). Since
lagged democracy scores explain enormous amounts of variation (beyond 94 percent),
the additional number of observations in the yearly dataset is welcome to support the
estimation of the effects of the other variables. The effect size of all specifications is
much smaller, amounting to only about ten percent of the fixed effects estimates. Note,
however, that I cannot assess whether a fixed-effects model or a LDV model is more
appropriate, and that the LDV may drown parts of the true effect. Given the large
estimates of the fixed effects IV specification, as shown in figure C2 at the beginning of
this appendix, even a fraction of those would still be substantial. I consider the LDV
results as additional strong support for my hypothesis.
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Table C34: Lagged dependent variable (LDV) model, yearly data
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Democracy 0.98∗ 0.97∗ 0.98∗ 0.97∗
[0.97; 0.99] [0.96; 0.98] [0.97; 0.99] [0.96; 0.98]
No. of dem. donors 0.05∗ 0.10∗
[0.01; 0.08] [0.03; 0.17]
No. of dem. donors (est.) 0.07∗ 0.11∗
[0.02; 0.11] [0.04; 0.19]
No. of econ. donors −0.06
[−0.13; 0.02]
Dem. aid (m USD; log) −0.03 −0.06
[−0.19; 0.13] [−0.26; 0.13]
Econ. aid (m USD; log) 0.61∗
[0.15; 1.07]
(Intercept) 1.07∗ −3.93∗ 0.93∗ −0.09
[0.61; 1.52] [−7.76; −0.10] [0.42; 1.44] [−2.16; 1.97]
Country fixed effects no no no no
Period fixed effects no no no no
Additional controls no yes no yes
# of observations 2343 2254 2343 2254
# of countries 134 132 134 132
R2 0.97 0.96 0.97 0.96
KP F-statistic 466.28 412.92
*) 95% confidence interval clustered at the country level (in brackets) does not include zero;
dependent variable: V-Dem polyarchy democracy index scaled to a range of [0; 100];
additional controls include population (log), GDP per capita (log) and a civil conflict dummy;
all explanatory variables lagged by one period.
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Table C35: Base OLSmodels with a squared term for the number of democracy donors
Model 1 Model 2
No. of dem. donors 0.90 0.67
[−0.22; 2.02] [−0.43; 1.77]
No. of dem. donors (squared) x 1/100 0.50 0.67
[−3.31; 4.31] [−3.22; 4.56]
No. of econ. donors 0.02
[−0.51; 0.56]
Dem. aid (m USD; log) 0.86
[−0.23; 1.95]
Econ. aid (m USD; log) 3.45∗
[0.71; 6.20]
Country fixed effects yes yes
Period fixed effects yes yes
Additional controls no yes
# of observations 715 715
# of countries 133 133
R2 0.93 0.93
*) 95% confidence interval clustered at the country level (in brackets) does not include zero;
dependent variable: V-Dem polyarchy democracy index scaled to a range of [0; 100];
additional controls include population (log), GDP per capita (log) and a civil conflict dummy;
all explanatory variables lagged by one period.
Nonlinear effects
One might suspect that there is a non-linear effect of democracy donor proliferation
on democracy in the recipient country. Table C35 provides results for both OLS spec-
ifications with additional squared terms of the number of democracy donors (models
1 and 2). In both models, the linear term for the number of democracy donors ceases
to be significant. The effect of an interaction, however, usually requires plotting for
proper interpretation (see Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006). Figure C3 provides
information on the estimated coefficient of the number of democracy donor on democ-
racy (solid line) over the range of values for the number of democracy donors (x-axis).
The grey area represents the conservative, country-clustered 95-percent confidence in-
terval, and the dotted line indicates whether the confidence interval excludes zero, i.e.,
whether we reject the null hypothesis of no association between the number of democ-
racy donors and democracy levels in the recipient country. The visual inspection of
the effect yields that the confidence intervals at the extremes increase substantially and
include zero when less than 8 or more than 22 democracy donors are present. As the
histogram in the plot indicates, a majority of observations has scores within this range
(64 percent), indicating a predominantly significant relationship. Moreover, the coeffi-
cient of the squared term is so tiny that the estimated relationship appears linear even
when allowing for non-linear effects. I conclude that the simpler models without inter-
action effects model the relationship sufficiently well. To be more cautious, one could
say that at very low and very hight numbers of democracy donors, I am less certain that
a diversity effect exists; I am more confident that is exists in the middle ranges.
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Figure C3: Estimated coefficient for the number of democracy donors on democracy
for a model including a squared term
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Table C36: Number of donors interacted with aid
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
No. of dem. donors 1.04∗ 0.96∗ −0.41
[0.52; 1.56] [0.47; 1.46] [−2.73; 1.91]
Dem. aid (m USD; log) 2.01∗ 1.09 0.79
[0.16; 3.86] [−0.15; 2.32] [−0.40; 1.98]
No. of dem. donors * dem. aid 0.12∗ 0.15
[0.06; 0.17] [−0.09; 0.40]
Pop. (log) x 10 0.67 1.55 0.54 0.20 −0.01
[−4.66; 6.01] [−4.12; 7.22] [−4.75; 5.82] [−5.08; 5.47] [−5.24; 5.23]
GDP p.c. (log) x 10 −0.70 −0.27 −0.71 −0.75 −0.76
[−2.15; 0.76] [−1.72; 1.18] [−2.14; 0.73] [−2.20; 0.70] [−2.19; 0.68]
Civil conflict −3.00 −3.32 −3.10 −2.95 −3.01
[−7.88; 1.88] [−9.03; 2.39] [−7.95; 1.75] [−7.75; 1.85] [−7.80; 1.78]
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Period fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Additional controls yes yes yes yes yes
# of observations 715 715 715 715 715
# of countries 133 133 133 133 133
R2 0.93 0.92 0.93 0.93 0.93
*) 95% confidence interval clustered at the country level (in brackets) does not include zero;
dependent variable: V-Dem polyarchy democracy index scaled to a range of [0; 100];
additional controls include population (log), GDP per capita (log) and a civil conflict dummy;
all explanatory variables lagged by one period.
Interactions with aid
One might expect that the effect of donor proliferation is conditional on the amount
of aid that is being spent in democracy aid. Tables C36 and C37 give results for inter-
actions of democracy donor proliferation with the per capita and absolute democracy
aid, respectively. Figures C4 and C5 show that the confidence interval excludes zero
only at levels above 4 USD per capita and 10 million USD in absolute aid commitments.
Almost 63 and 90 percent of recipient time periods, however, record levels above these
thresholds, respectively. One can thus conclude that there may be a minimum financial
threshold at which democracy donor proliferation becomes effective, but this threshold
is met in most cases.
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Figure C4: Estimated coefficient of the number of democracy donors on democracy
conditional on the amount of democracy aid
Table C37: Number of donors interacted with aid per capita
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
No. of dem. donors 1.04∗ 0.76∗ 0.44
[0.52; 1.56] [0.27; 1.26] [−0.30; 1.17]
Dem. aid (USD p.c.; log) 7.19∗ 4.70∗ 2.13
[3.81; 10.57] [1.98; 7.43] [−1.92; 6.18]
No. of dem. donors x dem. aid p.c. 0.49∗ 0.26
[0.30; 0.67] [−0.09; 0.61]
Pop. (log) x 10 0.67 2.07 1.08 1.28 1.08
[−4.66; 6.01] [−3.25; 7.38] [−4.06; 6.22] [−3.76; 6.32] [−3.99; 6.15]
GDP p.c. (log) x 10 −0.70 −0.43 −0.72 −0.68 −0.74
[−2.15; 0.76] [−1.82; 0.96] [−2.13; 0.68] [−2.11; 0.76] [−2.17; 0.69]
Civil conflict −3.00 −2.78 −2.80 −2.47 −2.61
[−7.88; 1.88] [−7.99; 2.42] [−7.50; 1.91] [−7.22; 2.29] [−7.22; 2.01]
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Period fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Additional controls yes yes yes yes yes
# of observations 715 715 715 715 715
# of countries 133 133 133 133 133
R2 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93
*) 95% confidence interval clustered at the country level (in brackets) does not include zero;
dependent variable: V-Dem polyarchy democracy index scaled to a range of [0; 100];
additional controls include population (log), GDP per capita (log) and a civil conflict dummy;
all explanatory variables lagged by one period.
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Figure C5: Estimated coefficient of the number of democracy donors on democracy
conditional on the amount of democracy aid per capita
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Interactions with democracy
As inspections of sub-samples of particular regime types above suggest, the effective-
ness of donor proliferation on democracy may be conditioned by the previous level of
democracy in the recipient country. In order to calculate the corresponding interac-
tion, I must resort to the conservative lagged dependent variable (LDV) model, with
lagged democracy scores soaking up almost all variance (see table C33 above). Table
C38 shows results for the interaction. Again, these results require a visual inspection for
proper interpretation. Figure C38 indicates that the 95-percent confidence interval for
the coefficient of the number of democracy donors on democracy excludes zero only
in countries that are in the lowest quartile of democracy scores. In other words, it sug-
gests that democracy donor proliferation is only effective in autocracies. This is some-
what surprising, given my theoretical expectations and the sub-sample results provided
above (tables C30 to C32). As the LDV model is the most conservative estimate avail-
able, however, it only provides a lower bound to my estimates. The fixed-effects and
instrumental-variable specifications provide much higher coefficient estimates. Should
the ‘true’ relationship thus be just slightly larger than the LDV estimates suggests, one
would expect the effect to hold much more into the intermediate ranges of democracy.
The significant range also increases well into intermediate scores of the democracy in-
dex when using yearly data (table C39 and and figure C7). I thus conclude that there
is some evidence that my hypothesis applies to autocracies and anocracies rather than
democracies. A potential explanation is that the latter might be able to provide suffi-
cient diversity domestically and do not benefit as much from external nudging.
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Table C38: Donor proliferation interacted with democracy, OLS models
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
No. of dem. donors 0.39 0.14∗ 0.35∗ 0.47∗
[−0.38; 1.16] [0.03; 0.26] [0.13; 0.57] [0.19; 0.75]
Democracy 0.95∗ 0.95∗ 0.99∗ 0.97∗
[0.93; 0.97] [0.93; 0.97] [0.96; 1.02] [0.94; 1.00]
No. of dem. donors x democracy x 1/100 −0.00∗ −0.00∗
[−0.01; −0.00] [−0.01; −0.00]
Pop. (log) x 10 0.04
[−0.52; 0.61]
GDP p.c. (log) x 10 −0.12
[−0.25; 0.01]
Civil conflict 0.18∗
[0.01; 0.35]
Dem. aid (m USD; log) 0.47
[−1.02; 1.97]
Country fixed effects no no no no no
Period fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Additional controls no no no no yes
# of observations 715 715 715 715 715
# of countries 133 133 133 133 133
R2 0.01 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92
*) 95% confidence interval clustered at the country level (in brackets) does not include zero;
dependent variable: V-Dem polyarchy democracy index scaled to a range of [0; 100];
additional controls include population (log), GDP per capita (log) and a civil conflict dummy;
all explanatory variables lagged by one period.
Table C39: Donor proliferation interacted with democracy, OLS models, yearly data
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
No. of dem. donors 0.32 0.07∗ 0.16∗ 0.20∗
[−0.50; 1.15] [0.03; 0.12] [0.06; 0.25] [0.07; 0.32]
Democracy 0.98∗ 0.98∗ 0.99∗ 0.98∗
[0.97; 0.99] [0.97; 0.99] [0.98; 1.00] [0.97; 0.99]
No. of dem. donors * democracy −0.00∗ −0.00
[−0.00; −0.00] [−0.00; 0.00]
Pop. (log) x 10 0.04
[−0.10; 0.19]
GDP p.c. (log) x 10 −0.03
[−0.08; 0.02]
Civil conflict 0.07∗
[0.02; 0.13]
Dem. aid (m USD; log) −0.46
[−1.12; 0.21]
Country fixed effects no no no no no
Period fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Additional controls no no no no yes
# of observations 2344 2343 2343 2343 2254
# of countries 134 134 134 134 132
R2 0.00 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.96
*) 95% confidence interval clustered at the country level (in brackets) does not include zero;
dependent variable: V-Dem polyarchy democracy index scaled to a range of [0; 100];
additional controls include population (log), GDP per capita (log) and a civil conflict dummy;
all explanatory variables lagged by one period.
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Figure C6: Estimated coefficient for the number of democracy donors on democracy
for a model including an interaction with democracy
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Figure C7: Estimated coefficient for the number of democracy donors on democracy
for a model including an interaction with democracy; yearly data
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Table C40: Base models with a global linear time trend
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Time trend −0.75 −0.43 −3.21∗ −2.73∗
[−1.78; 0.28] [−2.26; 1.40] [−5.57; −0.86] [−5.35; −0.12]
No. of dem. donors 0.99∗ 0.82∗
[0.50; 1.49] [0.32; 1.33]
No. of dem. donors (est.) 2.30∗ 2.38∗
[1.14; 3.46] [1.24; 3.52]
No. of econ. donors −0.03
[−0.53; 0.47]
Dem. aid (m USD; log) 0.66 −0.60
[−0.45; 1.77] [−2.00; 0.81]
Econ. aid (m USD; log) 3.63∗
[0.86; 6.40]
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Period fixed effects no no no no
Additional controls no yes no yes
# of observations 715 715 715 715
# of countries 133 133 133 133
R2 0.93 0.93 0.92 0.91
KP F-statistic 40.98 45.72
*) 95% confidence interval clustered at the country level (in brackets) does not include zero;
dependent variable: V-Dem polyarchy democracy index scaled to a range of [0; 100];
additional controls include population (log), GDP per capita (log) and a civil conflict dummy;
all explanatory variables lagged by one period.
Time trends
An alternative to year dummies for specifying time dynamics are linear time trends.
Table C40 shows that replacing year dummies with a global time trend does not affect
the results substantially. Table C41 shows that even regional time trends in addition to
year dummies do not affect the results either. The regional classification is taken from
the World Bank. The baseline region is ‘Europe and Central Asia’. It shows that in
the instrumental variable models (3 and 4), sub-Saharan African countries performed
better, on average, than European and Central Asian countries.
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Table C41: Base models with linear region time trends
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Time trend, South Asia 1.48 1.96 1.66 3.22
[−3.32; 6.28] [−3.27; 7.19] [−3.43; 6.74] [−2.39; 8.83]
Time trend, Middle East & North Africa 1.66 2.15 1.06 2.87
[−0.72; 4.05] [−0.57; 4.88] [−1.37; 3.49] [−0.07; 5.80]
Time trend, Latin America & Caribbean 0.03 0.58 1.17 2.36
[−2.03; 2.09] [−1.45; 2.61] [−1.16; 3.50] [−0.32; 5.05]
Time trend, Sub-Saharan Africa 1.43 2.27∗ 2.59∗ 5.13∗
[−0.13; 2.99] [0.13; 4.41] [0.64; 4.53] [1.80; 8.47]
Time trend, East Asia & Pacific −1.13 −0.51 −0.50 0.89
[−3.57; 1.31] [−3.17; 2.14] [−2.97; 1.97] [−2.11; 3.89]
No. of dem. donors 1.02∗ 0.94∗
[0.53; 1.52] [0.41; 1.46]
No. of dem. donors (est.) 2.66∗ 3.05∗
[1.38; 3.95] [1.58; 4.52]
No. of econ. donors 0.05
[−0.46; 0.55]
Dem. aid (m USD; log) 0.67 −0.68
[−0.46; 1.81] [−2.29; 0.92]
Econ. aid (m USD; log) 2.40
[−0.23; 5.04]
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Period fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Additional controls no yes no yes
# of observations 715 715 715 715
# of countries 133 133 133 133
R2 0.93 0.93 0.91 0.91
KP F-statistic 31.53 29.79
*) 95% confidence interval clustered at the country level (in brackets) does not include zero;
dependent variable: V-Dem polyarchy democracy index scaled to a range of [0; 100];
additional controls include population (log), GDP per capita (log) and a civil conflict dummy;
all explanatory variables lagged by one period.
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Table C42: Base models with contemporaneous effects
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
No. of dem. donors 0.86∗ 0.59∗
[0.39; 1.32] [0.07; 1.10]
No. of dem. donors (est.) 5.42∗ 5.97∗
[1.37; 9.46] [1.21; 10.74]
No. of econ. donors −0.17
[−0.70; 0.36]
Dem. aid (m USD; log) 1.73∗ −7.39
[0.10; 3.37] [−17.66; 2.88]
Econ. aid (m USD; log) 5.07∗
[1.77; 8.38]
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Period fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Additional controls no yes no yes
# of observations 715 713 715 713
# of countries 133 133 133 133
R2 0.93 0.93 0.79 0.77
KP F-statistic 5.60 4.99
*) 95% confidence interval clustered at the country level (in brackets) does not include zero;
dependent variable: V-Dem polyarchy democracy index scaled to a range of [0; 100];
additional controls include population (log), GDP per capita (log) and a civil conflict dummy;
all explanatory variables lagged by one period.
Contemporaneous effects
My base model assumes that democracy is affected by donor proliferation in the pre-
ceding time period. It might also be possible that effects are contemporaneous. Table
C42 provides results for models with a right-hand side that has not been lagged. I ob-
serve the same patters as in the base specifications. Only IV models 3 and 4 increase
the estimates into incredible regions: They are more than twice as large as the already-
large coefficients from the base specifications. In substantial terms, this would amount
to an increase of six to seven percentage points on the democracy scale per additional
donor. Given the much more conservative estimates of the LDV specifications, I do not
interpret this as credible evidence for larger effect sizes.
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Table C43: Base models, clustered by country and time period
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
No. of dem. donors 1.03∗ 0.84∗
[0.39; 1.67] [0.18; 1.51]
No. of dem. donors (est.) 2.58∗ 2.72∗
[1.35; 3.82] [1.48; 3.96]
No. of econ. donors 0.02
[−0.46; 0.50]
Dem. aid (m USD; log) 0.79 −0.60
[−0.28; 1.86] [−2.11; 0.92]
Econ. aid (m USD; log) 3.51∗
[0.90; 6.13]
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Period fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Additional controls no yes no yes
# of observations 715 715 715 715
# of countries 133 133 133 133
R2 0.93 0.93 0.91 0.91
KP F-statistic 23.46 20.97
*) 95% confidence interval clustered at the country and time period level (in brackets) does not include zero;
dependent variable: V-Dem polyarchy democracy index scaled to a range of [0; 100];
additional controls include population (log), GDP per capita (log) and a civil conflict dummy;
all explanatory variables lagged by one period.
Two-way clustered standard errors
Table C43 gives estimates of confidence intervals based on two-way clustered standard
errors. They are clustered by country and time period. The confidence intervals of my
variables of interest do not increase much compared to the base specifications. Conclu-
sions remain the same. Angrist and Pischke (2009: 319), however, note that clustered
standard errors with few groups are unreliable. As there are only seven time periods in
the standard dataset using three-year time windows, I refrain from clustering standard
errors by time period in my main specifications.
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Table C44: Base models with Conley standard errors
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
No. of dem. donors 0.98∗ 0.77∗
[0.67; 1.30] [0.43; 1.10]
No. of dem. donors (est.) 2.69∗ 2.91∗
[1.82; 3.56] [2.01; 3.81]
No. of econ. donors 0.04
[−0.29; 0.36]
Dem. aid (m USD; log) 0.83 −1.21
[−0.23; 1.88] [−2.73; 0.32]
Econ. aid (m USD; log) 4.05∗
[2.00; 6.11]
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Period fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Additional controls no yes no yes
# of observations 701 701 701 701
# of countries 0 0 0 0
R2 0.93 0.94 0.91 0.91
KP F-statistic 30.55 31.82
* 95% confidence interval clustered over five periods and countries with capitals within 1,000 kilometers (in brackets)
does not include zero; additional controls include population (log), GDP per capita (log) and a civil conflict dummy;
all explanatory variables lagged by one period; dependent variable: V-Dem polyarchy democracy index [0; 100].
Heteroscedasticity-and-autocorrelation-robust standard errors
All models so far assume that the errors of our observations are independent over time
and space. Conley (1999) suggests a method that allows units’ errors to correlate over
a certain number of periods and within a certain distance. Table C44 gives the re-
sults of the base model with standard errors that permit serial correlation over three
periods (i.e., 12 years) and spatial correlation over 500 kilometers between countries’
capitals. The resulting 95-percent confidence intervals are actually slightly smaller than
the country-clustered standard errors from the base specification. The substantive in-
terpretation of my results remains unchanged.
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Table C45: OLS base models without fragmentation indicators
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Aid (m USD; log) 6.54∗
[2.94; 10.14]
Dem. aid (m USD; log) 2.01∗ 1.43
[0.16; 3.86] [−0.09; 2.96]
Econ. aid (m USD; log) 5.69∗ 5.02∗
[2.22; 9.15] [1.98; 8.07]
Pop. (log) x 10 4.57 15.53 5.91 4.50
[−50.38; 59.53] [−41.17; 72.22] [−49.84; 61.66] [−50.46; 59.46]
GDP p.c. (log) x 10 −0.30 −0.27 −0.29 −0.34
[−1.76; 1.15] [−1.72; 1.18] [−1.76; 1.17] [−1.78; 1.09]
Civil conflict −3.00 −3.32 −2.97 −3.11
[−8.21; 2.21] [−9.03; 2.39] [−8.28; 2.34] [−8.35; 2.14]
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Period fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Additional controls yes yes yes yes
# of observations 715 715 715 715
# of countries 133 133 133 133
R2 0.93 0.92 0.93 0.93
*) 95% confidence interval clustered at the country level (in brackets) does not include zero;
dependent variable: V-Dem polyarchy democracy index scaled to a range of [0; 100];
additional controls include population (log), GDP per capita (log) and a civil conflict dummy;
all explanatory variables lagged by one period.
Models without fragmentation indicators
Table C45 provides OLS estimates on the relationship between aid and democracy with-
out including proliferation or fragmentation indicators. It serves as a point of reference
to interpret the behavior of the aid variables in the absence of information on the num-
ber of donors. General aid (model 1), democracy aid (2) and economic aid (3) all display
a positive and significant correlation with democracy. When adding democracy aid and
economic aid simultaneously to the model, only the estimated confidence interval for
the coefficient of economic aid excludes zero, although the lower bound for the coef-
ficient estimates of democracy aid is very close to zero. Table C46 repeats the same
exercise with aid per capita indicators. Here, democracy aid remains significant even
when added to the model jointly with economic aid (model 4).
C-47
Table C46: OLS base models without fragmentation indicators
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Aid (USD p.c.; log) 6.93∗
[3.20; 10.66]
Dem. aid (USD p.c.; log) 7.19∗ 6.12∗
[3.81; 10.57] [3.28; 8.95]
Econ. aid (USD p.c.; log) 5.98∗ 4.23∗
[2.37; 9.60] [1.64; 6.83]
Pop. (log) x 10 11.68 20.67 12.21 15.18
[−42.84; 66.19] [−32.48; 73.82] [−43.18; 67.59] [−36.92; 67.28]
GDP p.c. (log) x 10 −0.31 −0.43 −0.30 −0.48
[−1.77; 1.15] [−1.82; 0.96] [−1.77; 1.18] [−1.87; 0.92]
Civil conflict −2.92 −2.78 −2.89 −2.65
[−8.13; 2.30] [−7.99; 2.42] [−8.22; 2.44] [−7.58; 2.29]
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Period fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Additional controls yes yes yes yes
# of observations 715 715 715 715
# of countries 133 133 133 133
R2 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93
*) 95% confidence interval clustered at the country level (in brackets) does not include zero;
dependent variable: V-Dem polyarchy democracy index scaled to a range of [0; 100];
additional controls include population (log), GDP per capita (log) and a civil conflict dummy;
all explanatory variables lagged by one period.
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Reverse models
Donors may prefer to give democracy aid to more democratic countries, as these are
more inclined to further liberalize politically. I address this issue in the main paper
using an instrumental variable approach and lagged three-year time windows. To com-
plement this approach, I here investigate the possibility of reverse causation by estimat-
ing a reverse model that attempts to explain the number of democracy donors with
the lagged level of democracy. Table C47 provides the results of these reversed spec-
ifications. There is no statistically significant relationship between democracy levels in
the preceding period on the number of democracy donors (model 1). Note that the
number of democracy donors in the preceding period did correlate significantly with
the level of democracy (model 1 in table C1). Adding controls does not change the null
finding (models 2 and 3). The amount of democracy aid in the preceding period is not
a good predictor of the number of democracy donors, either. Population size and the
number of economic donors are the only significant predictors in these specifications.
The number of general donors is not predicted by democracy levels either (model 4).
In sum, the reverse specifications imply that increases in the number of democracy
donors precede increases in democracy levels, and not vice versa. Such an instance of
‘Granger causality’ is no definite proof of my causal mechanism. In combination with
the evidence from the instrumental variable specifications, and the plausibility checks
from the case study on Ghana, however, the reverse models provide additional sup-
port to my main hypothesis of a beneficial effect of democracy donor proliferation on
democracy.
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Table C47: Reverse models: democracy and donor proliferation
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Level of democracy 0.02 0.01 0.01 −0.01
[−0.00; 0.05] [−0.01; 0.04] [−0.02; 0.03] [−0.03; 0.02]
Democracy aid (m USD; log) 0.40 0.27
[−0.16; 0.97] [−0.20; 0.75]
Number of economic donors 0.20∗
[0.07; 0.34]
Economic aid (m USD; log) 0.36
[−0.47; 1.19]
Aid (m USD; log) 1.05∗
[0.22; 1.87]
Pop. (log) x 10 1.40∗ 1.29∗ 1.08
[0.05; 2.75] [0.02; 2.56] [−0.07; 2.23]
GDP p.c. (log) x 10 −0.06 −0.08 −0.07
[−0.51; 0.38] [−0.50; 0.33] [−0.44; 0.29]
Civil conflict 0.39 0.29 0.43
[−0.53; 1.31] [−0.62; 1.21] [−0.36; 1.22]
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Period fixed effects yes yes yes yes
# of observations 715 715 715 715
# of countries 133 133 133 133
R2 0.88 0.88 0.89 0.90
*) 95% confidence interval clustered at the country level (in brackets) does not include zero;
dependent variable: V-Dem polyarchy democracy index scaled to a range of [0; 100];
all explanatory variables lagged by one period.
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Introduction
The case of Ghana will help illustrate how the mechanism of the diversity hypothesis
works. It has several observable implications that can be traced: We can see how the
democracy aid provided by donors varies by donor. We can see whether certain lo-
cal actors benefited from particular donors And we can reasonably attempt to gauge
whether this interaction improved democracy in Ghana. Note that this is not a test of
causality, but rather an exploration of the plausibility of the causal mechanism.
Why choose Ghana for this purpose? One could argue that the case selection should
be guided by the preceding quantitative analysis. This approach has found substantial
interest in the political science community over the past decade. Lieberman (2005)
proposes that a case situated on the regression line can be considered typical, thus
being a good choice for model-testing. The danger of this approach is that an overly
misspecified model – and all models are at least somewhat misspecified – could make
an atypical case look typical, passing on the error from the statistical analysis to the case
study while mistakenly increasing trust in the subsequent inference (Rohlfing 2008). I
thus apply a more conservative approach for selecting my case, based on the discernible
presence of both the dependent and the independent variable (Goertz and Mahoney
2012: 177–191). If fragmentation has an impact on democratization, it is best observed
in a country that receives aid from many donors and has experienced an improvement
of democracy scores during the period under scrutiny. To ensure the availability of
sufficient information, it is furthermore beneficial to choose a case that has received a
large amount of scholarly attention. Ghana fulfills these criteria.
Ghana gained independence from Great Britain in 1957. The country was governed
by the leader of the independence movement, Kwame Nkrumah, and his Convention
People’s Party (CPP) until a coup in 1966. Ensuing attempts to re-establish a civil gov-
ernment resulted in instability and another pair of coups in 1979 and 1981, led by
Jerry Rawlings. At the expense of civil liberties, Rawlings managed to prevent further
revolts and to strengthen the economy. In 1992, Rawlings yielded to domestic and
international pressure and introduced a multi-party democracy, not least due to his
good chances of remaining in office (Haynes 2003; cp. Wright 2009). In the year 2000,
Rawlings’ National Democratic Congress (NDC) lost the elections to the New Patriotic
Party (NPP) under John Kufuor, but won it back in a close race in 2008 under John
Atta Mills, completing the two-turnover test for Ghana’s democracy (Lynch and Craw-
ford 2011). After his death in July 2012, Mills was followed in office by John Mahama,
who also won the 2012 elections. The results of these last elections were initially chal-
lenged by the NPP, but subsequently confirmed by the Supreme Court. In the 2016
elections, the ruling party changed once more, with Nana Akufo-Addo and the NPP
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beating incumbent Mahama.
Ghana is a presidential system with a majoritarian voting system. Even after the first
turnover in the year 2000, Haynes (2003: 68) still argued that the ‘rules of fair play
acceptable to all significant political and social actors [were] not yet agreed upon’. Clien-
telism remains a strong force, due to considerable state control over economic resources
(Ichino and Nathan 2013; Lindberg 2010). But it is by far not the only force driving
election results: The provision of public services is indeed rewarded by the Ghanaian
voter (Weghorst and Lindberg 2013). In contrast to many other African countries, eth-
nicity has not been politicized as a major cleavage, but regions play a strong role in
informal politics (Koter 2013; Nugent 2001; Osei and Malang 2016; Whitfield 2009).
Ghana had been close to the socialist block during the Cold War, but soon began to
implement structural adjustment programmes in the 1990s (Handley 2008). Today,
the country is one of the so-called “donor darlings”, combining democratic governance
with economic neediness.
Looking at general aid in Ghana, one may get the impression that some of the detri-
mental effects of aid fragmentation are actually at play. The number of donors report-
ing aid to Ghana increased from 15 in 1994 to 24 in 2013. The fragmentation index
was already high in 1994 and increased only marginally until 2013, from 0.83 to 0.86.
The presumed lack of coordination among donors is confirmed by observers: The rate
of harmonization is judged to be very slow, and advanced coordination mechanisms
such as EU joint programming have only been introduced recently (Wood et al. 2011).
Hence, it is not easy for the Ghanaian government to accommodate the large number
of donors wanting to work with them. There is evidence that “[…] the budget process
was increasingly directed toward satisfying external donors rather than reflecting ac-
tual public spending preferences” (Moss, Pettersson, and Van de Walle 2008: 7). Also
the direct funding of the government via budget support contributed to undermining
parliament’s ability to hold executive to account (Lawson et al. 2007). Donor funding
to NGOs was often not reported to the government, violating accountability promises
by the donors (Wood et al. 2011: 101). These observations suggest that the uncoor-
dinated engagement of several donors may have damaged the domestic accountability
chain.
The net effect of fragmented aid estimated by my models, however, is positive. And
there is plenty of anecdotal evidence that democracy donor proliferation actually im-
proved democracy in Ghana. I will look primarily at two types of local recipients,
namely political parties and media outlets. The degree of fragmentation in democracy
aid is high, as is the receptiveness of Ghana’s non-governmental actors. The number
of donors reporting democracy aid to Ghana rose from 5 in 1994 to 24 in 2013. An
example of a larger governance programme is Strengthening Transparency, Accountability
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and Responsiveness (STAR-Ghana), funded by the United Kingdom, Denmark and the
EU. The programme aims at developing ‘a vibrant, well-informed and assertive civil so-
ciety able to contribute to transformational national development and inclusive access
to high quality, accountable public services for all Ghanaian citizens.’1 Experts differ
in their assessments on whether democracy aid has had a positive impact on democ-
ratization in Ghana (Crawford 2005; Gyimah-Boadi and Yakah 2012). Civil society in
Ghana is generally strong, but ‘the opportunism of many so-called NGOs’ has led the
donors to tighten their funding criteria, which reduces local ownership (Mohan 2002:
148). NGOs also represent mostly urban interests (Haynes 2003: 69). Ghana’s civil and
political society is thus somewhat deficient, but it has the potential and the freedom to
benefit from a differentiated array of external help.
Party aid
A specific sector of democracy aid that exemplifies this potential is party aid. In 2002,
the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD), a government funded organisa-
tion promoting democracy on behalf of several Dutch political parties, partnered with
the Institute of Economics Affairs (IEA) inGhana to help found theGhana Political Parties Pro-
gramme (GPPP) (Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy 2002: 11). The GPPP
constitutes an ‘interparty dialogue platform’ that aims at improving relations between
political parties, including several extra-parliamentary parties (Dijkstra and Kumado
2004: 2; van Breukelen and Magolowondo 2010: 8). As no other forms of institution-
alized exchange between parties existed in Ghana at the time of the establishment of
the GPPP, it provided a crucial component in increasing communication (Dijkstra and
Kumado 2004: 21). In 2007, the programme launched a ‘Democracy Consolidation
Strategy Paper’, which led to various institutional reforms, and in 2012, it organized a
public debate of candidates for the presidency (Mensa 2014). Other effects attributed to
the GPPP are successful settlements around the electoral commission, generating addi-
tional trust in the institution, and general support to ‘free and fair elections, a peaceful
change of power and democratic reforms’ (van Breukelen and Magolowondo 2010: 8,
12).
A tangible effect that deserves additional attention and that can be traced back to the
Dutch funding is securing the survival of several small parties, including the CPP and
the People’s National Convention (PNC) (Gyimah-Boadi and Yakah 2012: 14). But
what effect could support for small parties have in a de-facto two-party system like
Ghana? First, despite their weakness, the survival of the small parties led to a slightly
more competitive party system, thus improving chances of democratic consolidation (cp.
1http://www.star-ghana.org/about-star-ghana/about-star-ghana-2/
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Wright 2008). Second, small parties have at times won a share of votes in the parliamen-
tary elections that is bigger than the margin between NPP and NDC, giving them more
leverage than their vote share suggests (Ichino and Nathan 2013: 432). They were
sometimes necessary to secure a majority in parliament; one example was the coalition
between the NPP and the People’s Convention Party (PCP) after the 1996 elections (Ar-
riola 2013: 264; Whitfield 2009: 622). Such formal involvements are an important but
not the only channel by which small parties can influence the politicization of societal
cleavages (cp. Zielinski 2002). Despite the sustained drive towards dominance of the
two major parties that was strengthened in the 2016 elections, analysts still concede a
crucial role to smaller parties. The main parties are often captured by elites, which is
a problem in many young democracies, and also in Ghana (cp. Grzymala-Busse 2007;
Osei 2013). The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) notes
that ‘[…] the NDC and the NPP[,] are a substantial impediment to reducing the concen-
tration of power in the executive branch’ (Fox et al. 2011: 35). The survival of parties
outside the establishment can reduce the threat of collusion among dominant parties by
threatening exposure, as Gottlieb (2015) shows for Mali. Macerating the defenses of the
political establishment requires organized alternatives as offered by the small parties.
In sum, the survival of small parties improved Ghanaian democracy, and the survival
of these parties depended crucially on the support of a particular donor. The Nether-
lands are not the only donor supporting the IEA (Netherlands Institute for Multiparty
Democracy 2012: 16), but the GPPP can be decidedly traced back to a Dutch initia-
tive (Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy 2002: 11). In a less fragmented
donor environment, the probability of having a donor that bothered with saving the
small parties would have been smaller, and thus, democracy would have benefited less
from democracy aid. Dijkstra and Kumado (2004: 15) confirm that Dutch support pro-
vided a unique contribution: ‘[…] everyone interviewed by the evaluators stressed the
uniqueness of the [N]IMD/IEA programme in relation to the interventions of other de-
velopment partners in Ghana because of the bilateral programme and the cross party
activities.’
Media aid
Media aid is a second example that illustrates how democracy donor proliferation may
help improve democracy. The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES), a German political foun-
dation whose development activities are mostly funded through the official German
aid budget, contributed substantially towards supporting independent media providers
(Gyimah-Boadi and Yakah 2012). This included both immediate technical aid and pres-
sure to liberalize the access to provide media. While Ghanaian media is often portrayed
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as highly partisan (Temin and Smith 2002: 592), it is well documented that the media
played a crucial role in the development of domestic democracy (Arthur 2010; Lind-
berg 2010). Conroy-Krutz and Moehler (2015) conducted a field experiment in Ghana
that supports the notion that free and controversial media did not lead to additional
polarization, but rather the opposite. They exposed participants in the experiment to
different types of arguments over the radio during their public transport commutes,
and partisan arguments increased the appreciation of opposing views.
As Dutch aid for party survival, German aid for freemedia constitutes a crucial contribu-
tion without which public debate would have had much less support. Figure D2 shows
that Germany committed projects of at least 10,000 USD in five of the twenty examined
years. Only the United States and UNICEF – an organizations whose main business is
not press freedom – reported commitments with this activity code as frequently as Ger-
many. All but one year record three or less donors committing new projects. One
could ask whether free information could be supported via other measures. The most
obvious alternative is infrastructure for radio, television and print media, a subsector
of ‘Economic Infrastructure and Services’. Here, a total of seven donors reports activ-
ities, and most intensely, France until 2004. Nonetheless, neither subsector seems to
suffer from too much donor involvement. Aid data at low levels of disaggregation are
most likely subject to large amounts of missing data, but the suspicion that donors make
unique contributions tomaintaining diversity in political approaches receives consistent
support from the data that is available.
World Bank − International Development Association (IDA)
United States
United Nations Democracy Fund (UNDEF)
United Nations Children`s Fund (UNICEF)
United Kingdom
United Arab Emirates
Switzerland
Spain
Netherlands
Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS)
Japan
Italy
Germany
France
Denmark
Canada
Australia
1995 2000 2005 2010
Year
Figure D1: Commitments over 10,000 USD by donor and year coded with AidData
activity code ‘free flow of information’ (code 15150.08)
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World Bank − International Finance Corporation (IFC)
United Nations Democracy Fund (UNDEF)
Norway
Italy
Germany
France
Canada
1995 2000 2005 2010
Year
Figure D2: Commitments over 10,000 USD by donor and year coded with the AidData
purpose code for mass media infrastructure (code 22030)
Conclusion
Given these anecdotes on democracy donor proliferation and democracy in Ghana, is
it possible to construct a ‘plausible counterfactual’ (Lebow 2000) of a Ghana with less
diversity in democracy aid? Both political parties and media have been shown to be ad-
vantageous in the democratization process. Since every donor has a particular way of
approaching democracy-related issues, the loss of one donor means that some local ac-
tors lose their best-matching partner as soon as one donor leaves. Because donors pick
certain areas and modes of engagement with their specific projects, a more fragmented
donor environment provides more options. The corollary of the qualitative evidence
is that even in a country with a fragmented aid setting such as Ghana, other donors
would probably not have replaced the very same efforts of the NIMD and the FES, had
one of them pulled out. The theorized causal direction also receives anecdotal support.
While a democratizing country as Ghana may be more attractive to democracy promot-
ers than authoritarian regimes, it becomes clear from these examples that particular
improvements followed from a diverse donor presence. The NIMD did not come to
Ghana because small parties survived, and the FES did not come to Ghana because
there were gradual improvements in press freedom during the 2000’s; both donors
had arrived before these developments, and there is considerable evidence that both
contributed crucially to the outcomes. Overall, recent history of Ghana supports the
notion that a link from donor diversity to democratization is plausible.
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